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A SOCAL HISTORY OF INDUSTRIAL STRIKES 
 AND THE LABOUR MOVEMENT IN HONG KONG 
1946-1989 
 
Benjamin Leung and Stephen Chiu 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION: A HISTORICAL PROFILE OF STRIKES IN HONG KONG, 
1946-89 
 
Despite its rapid socio-economic development and the concomitant glaring social inequality, 
Hong Kong has been remarkably free from social conflict and instability. A major factor 
underlying this paradox is the acquiescent workforce and the ineffective labour movement in 
Hong Kong. A number of writers (e.g. England 1979, 1989; Turner 1980; Levin and Jao 1988) 
have offered explanations for Hong Kong's peaceful industrial relations. The aim of our paper is 
to complement the by and large analytic accounts of previous writers through a detailed 
historical survey of industrial strikes and the labour movement in Hong Kong since the end of 
the Second World War. We hope to describe vividly and in detail the conditions and atmosphere 
in which strikes and the labour movement developed. In the process, we also contribute our 
contextual explanations of the development of events. We draw heavily on primary sources of 
information such as press reports and official publications, but where appropriate, we also rely 
on secondary sources.1 To highlight the contours of development, we organize our presentation 
into seven periods, each in our view characterized by relatively distinctive socio-economic and 
political features which in turn impacted on the development of the labour movement and strikes.   
 
Strikes, generally understood as stoppages of work by groups of workers in protest to 
management, are a relatively extreme form of industrial action. As a collective endeavour to 
confront and wrestle concessions from management, strikes are an expression of the unity and 
strength of working people, and of their determination to defend and advance their interests and 
rights.  They not only reflect the social and economic discontents of workers, but are also their 
political statements.  Strikes (or
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their absence) are therefore an important indication of the strength and nature of the labour 
movement. 
 
A history of strikes is thus a history of the political strength and ideology of workers, and also a 
history of the major socio-economic and political changes in our community in so far as they 
impinge on the well-being, organization, and political consciousness of working people. In 
constructing this history we shall identify and explain the fluctuations in the frequency of strikes 
and the changes in their magnitude and nature over time. 
 
 
The Level of Strikes, 1946-89: A Historical Profile 
 
The level of strikes for a specified period can be measured by the frequency of their occurrences, 
the number of strikers involved, and the number of man-days lost due to the stoppages. Each 
measure provides information on some particular aspects of strikes and does not necessarily vary 
in the same direction as the other measures. But the number of man-days lost, obtained by 
multiplying the number of days lost through stoppage and the number of strikers involved, is 
generally used as a summary indication of the level of a strike, and by extension, the level of 
strikes in a particular period. A detailed analysis of strikes, however, would involve a separate 
inquiry into each of the above dimensions. Table 1 presents the basic information on the level of 
strikes for various years. The accompanying diagrams are graphic illustrations of the historical 
trend. 
 
From the information presented in Table 1 and diagrams 1-3, we can make the following general 
observations about the long-term movement of strikes. The level of strikes, as indicated by the 
number of man-days lost, is high (by Hong Kong standards) in the period 1946-9.2 A downward 
trend begins from 1950 and thereafter the level remains low on the whole and fluctuates within a 
narrow range to 1989. The frequency of strikes, however, exhibits a very different trend, 
generally low from 1946 to 1965, followed by an upward movement in 1966-1982, and then 
going down again from 1983. The number of strikers shows relatively the most fluctuating trend 
but if we consider those years with around 10,000 or more strikers to be peaks, then 1947, 1959, 
1971-1973, and 1979 qualify as such. 
 
 
The Propensity to Strike: A Historical Profile 
 
INTRODUCTION 7  
In Table 2 and diagrams 4-6, we control the three measures of the level of strikes by the number 
of employed workers to derive the propensity to strike. 
 
The data indicate a generally declining trend with minor fluctuations for all three measures of 
strikes since 1949. This decline is most consistent and dramatic in the case of the number of 
man-days lost per 1,000 workers, which is the best overall indicator of the workers' propensity to 
strike. A similar, though less consistent, pattern can be seen in the other two measures. We can 
thus conclude, bearing in mind some minor counter-trends, that the workers were becoming less 
inclined to strike after 1949. It is further worth pointing out, as a note of contemporary interest, 
that this downward trend has been most consistent and conspicuous in the 1980s. 
 
We present in summary Tables 3 and 4 a comparison of the annual averages of the strike indices 
for the seven periods in this study. The annual averages are obtained through dividing the total 
strike statistics for each period by the number of years in that period. These annual averages thus 
give us an idea of the level of strikes and its propensity to strike for each period in comparison to 
other periods. As we go through each period later in our discussion, we shall keep referring back 
to these two summary tables for the purpose of comparison. 
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Table 1: The Level of Strikes 1946-89 
 
     Year            No. of Strikes             No. of Workers      No. of man-days 
                                                               involved (00s)                  lost (00s) 
 
1946 - 47 14   66 1,192 
1947 - 48 10 142 2,787 
1948 - 49 12   18    262 
1949 - 50 12   72 1,824 
1950 - 51   3     3      43 
1951 - 52 11   20    530 
1952 - 53   1     1        2 
1953 - 54   2   45 1,485 
1954 - 55   4   26      31 
1955 - 56 11   18    325 
1956 - 57   9   17      96 
1957 - 58   3     8    134 
1958 - 59   5     9      22 
1959 - 60 12 120    300 
1960 - 61   8   40    290 
1961 - 62 10   27    176 
1962 - 63 12   34    272 
1963 - 64 17   58    734 
1964 - 65 13   21    433 
1965 - 66   7   39    653 
1966 - 67 17   38    375 
1967 - 68  -    -      - 
1968 - 69 28   40    139 
1969 - 70 32   40    371 
1970 - 71 47 140    537 
1971 - 72 40   70    212 
1972 - 73 43 150    428 
1973 - 74 40 160    471 
1974 - 75 17   50    100 
1975  15   40    157 
1976 14   30      47 
1977 36   41    106 
1978 50   83    300 
1979 44   99    392 
1980 36   61    200 
1981 49   61    153 
1982 32   73    177 
1983 11   11      25 
1984 11   23      31 
1985   3     4      12 
1986   9   21      49 
1987 15   18      30 
1988   8     9      23 
1989 10   42      33 
                                                                    
Notes to this table are on page **. 
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Table 2: The Propensity to Strike 1946-89 
 
     Year          No. of strikes                 No. of strikers       No. of man-days 
                         per 100,000                        per 1,000                 lost per 1,000 
                            workers                            workers                         workers 
 
1946 - 47 28 132 2,385 
1947 - 48 19 277 5,429 
1948 - 49 20   30    433 
1949 - 50 19 111 2,814 
1950 - 51   3     4      48 
1951 - 52 12   21    566 
1952 - 53   1     1        2 
1953 - 54   2   45 1,470 
1954 - 55   4   25      30 
1955 - 56   9   16    335 
1956 - 57   6   12      69 
1957 - 58   2     5      90 
1958 - 59   3     5      13 
1959 - 60   6   63    159 
1960 - 61   3   17    127 
1961 - 62   4   12      77 
1962 - 63   4   12      98 
1963 - 64   6   19    243 
1964 - 65   4     6    123 
1965 - 66   2   11    183 
1966 - 67   5   10      99 
1967 - 68   -    -      - 
1968 - 69   5     9      33 
1969 - 70   7     8      76 
1970 - 71   9   26    101 
1971 - 72   7   13      40 
1972 - 73   8   29      77 
1973 - 74   7   28      82 
1974 - 75   3     9      18 
1975   2     6      23 
1976   2     4        6 
1977   5     5      14 
1978   6   10      37 
1979   5   11      45 
1980   4     7      22 
1981   5     7      17 
1982   4     9      21 
1983   1     2        3 
1984   1     3        3 
1985   0.4     0.5        1 
1986   1     2        6 
1987   2     2        3 
1988   1     1        3 
1989   1     0.05        0.04 
                                                                        
Notes to this table are on page **, 
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Notes to Tables 1 and 2 
 
Table 1  
Source: Annual Reports, Labour Department.  
Note: The Labour Department did not provide information on the 'political' strikes of 1967-8. 
Data before 1975 cover financial years (1 April-31 March). Data from 1975 cover calender 
years. The above historical profile gives us a general picture of the level of strikes in various 
periods but does not provide sufficient information on the workers' propensity to strike. All other 
things being equal, the number of employed workers obviously bears directly on the level of 
strikes. In other words, a high level of strikes may simply be due to a larger number of workers 
in the economy and does not  necessarily indicate a greater readiness to strike on the part of the 
workers. To have an account of the workers' propensity to strike, we must therefore match the 
level of strikes with employment figures. 
 
Table 2  
 Source: Annual Reports, Labour Department. 
Note: 'Workers' refers to employees in registered establishments. 
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Table 3: A Summary of Total Strike Activity, Annual Averages by Period  
 
    Year                  No. of strikes            No. of workers                  No. of man- 
                                                                   involved (00s)                  days lost (00s) 
                                                                            
1946-49 12  75 1,516 
1950-59   6  27    297 
1960-66 12  37    419 
1968-73 38                                 100    360 
1974-81 33  58    182 
1982-89 12  25      48 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: A Summary of Propensity to Strike, Annual Averages by Period* 
 
    Year                   No. of strikes                    No. of strikers                No. of man- 
                                 per 100,000                   per 1,000 workers            days lost per 
                                   workers                                                                   1,000 workers 
                                                                        
 
1946-49 22 138 2,765 
1950-59   5   20    278 
1960-66   4   12    136 
1968-73*   7   (3)   19   (8)      68 (28) 
1974-81   4   (2)     7   (3)      23 (10) 
1982-89   1.4(0.6)     2.4(1)        5   (2) 
                                                                    
* Two sets of figures are given from this period on. The first set is based on workers in registered 
establishments. The figures in brackets are based on all employees, which are available from 1968 
onwards. 
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2. THE POST-WAR YEARS OF HIGH INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT: 1946-9 
 
It is ironical that the end of the Second World War should be followed immediately by a period 
of high industrial conflict, the highest in fact of the post-war years with the exception of 1967. 
One is tempted to explain this in terms of the general social and economic disruptions and 
deprivations in the aftermath of war. But this explanation does not apply at least in the case of 
Britain, the United States, and Australia, where the level of strikes in the immediate post-war 
years was either low (Britain) or about average (the US and Australia) in comparison with the 
rest of the post-war period.3 It is therefore probable that the high level of strikes in Hong Kong 
in the few years after the war was due to special conditions in the industrial structure and 
industrial relations that distinguish this period from subsequent years. 
 
 
The Overall Pattern of Strike Activity 
 
As can be seen from the summary Tables 3 and 4, the level of strike activity for the period is 
high only in terms of numbers of workers involved and man-days lost. The number of strikes is 
in fact low in comparison with the rest of the post-war period. This suggests that compared with 
later years, strikers in the immediate post-war period were more collectively and centrally 
mobilized and able to engage in protracted struggles with managements. The lower number of 
strikes thus reflects greater unity and strength among the strikers as a collectivity, in contrast to 
the higher number of small short, strikes in later years. 
 
Tables 3 and 4 indicate unambiguously that the workers in the immediate post-war years were 
far more ready to strike than in subsequent years. What conditions and factors then contributed 
to the high level of strikes and high strike propensity in these years? 
 
 
 
 
The Background 
 
Like other forms of collective action, strikes are primarily the outcome of a combination of two 
conditions: the participants' discontents and grievances, and their ability to mobilize for 
collective action. Economic hardship in the aftermath of war generated the former; the rapid 
revival of trade unionism upon the British reoccupation of the territory facilitated the latter. Such 
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conditions are unique in the history of post-war industrial conflict and contributed to the 
exceptionally high level of strikes in the immediate post-war period. 
 
A brief reference to reports on the social and economic conditions of the time will give us a 
general picture of the deprivations the working people were facing and protesting about. Quoting 
government sources, the Wah Kiu Yat Po (26 May 1946) described the Colony as facing 'a rapid 
rise in the cost of living', 'a shortage of rice, building materials, housing, clothing and many other 
basic necessities'. England and Rear (1981:134), in accounting for the high level of industrial 
conflict in the period, mentioned the scarcity of food, and 'the increase in the cost of free market 
rice from 30 cents per catty in February 1946 to over $2 in May'. 
 
A Wah Kiu Yat Po editorial (25 May 1946) directly attributed the industrial disputes of the time 
to economic hardship and carried an implicit explanation for the workers' protracted struggles to 
improve their livelihood: 
 
'Social and economic deprivations are the main cause of the current industrial 
conflict. ... There are at present no easy ways to overcome these difficulties. We 
believe that wage increases are not effective solutions, for such increases simply 
cannot catch up with the rise in the cost of living. ...  Only when daily necessities 
are in plentiful supply, when the basic requirements of life are satisfied, can we 
have a solution to the present problems'. 
 
Such reports were consonant with the professed objectives of the strikers, who emphasized in 
their statements to the press and the public that their motives were solely economic and not 
political. Indeed the two powerful workers' organizations with clear political affiliations, the pro-
communist Federation of Trade Unions (FTU), and the pro-Kuomintang Trade Union Council 
(TUC), were not established until 1947 and 1948 respectively. Before that time, a politically 
independent workers' union, the Chinese Engineers' Institute, played the roles of labour's 
spokesman, co-ordinator, and negotiator with government and management in many of the 
industrial disputes of the immediate post-war years. Its decline after 1949 and the subsequent 
ascendance and dominance of the FTU and the TUC substantially changed the nature of 
industrial relations and industrial conflict in later years. But in the few years after the war, its 
leadership helped to mobilize the workers in their struggles. 
 
Founded in 1909, the Chinese Engineers' Institute was a trade union composed mainly of 
mechanics from various occupations. It first came to prominence in the mechanics' strike of 
1920, when it successfully organized and led some 6,000 mechanics from 26 establishments in 
an 18-day strike against managements. It is noteworthy that despite the nationalist and anti-
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imperialist fervour generated by the May 4 movement of the previous year in China, the 
mechanics' strike was not politically motivated. It was prompted, as Pauline Chow (1986) noted, 
by the economic hardship afflicting the Colony in the aftermath of the First World War. The 
strike won for the mechanics a general wage increase of 30 per cent and consolidated the 
position of the Chinese Engineers' Institute as the representative and leader of the local 
mechanics. At the same time the union's political non-affiliation, and its orderly and disciplined 
handling of the strike established it as a responsible trade union in the eyes of the colonial 
government. This paved the way for the Institute's later role as mediator and negotiator between 
labour, and government and management. 
 
A couple of subsequent events further helped to improve the image and status of the Institute in 
industrial relations. During the 1930s, a decade of industrial peace, the Institute assisted the 
government in recruiting students for the government-sponsored training classes for mechanics. 
And in 1941, the Institute through the assistance of government again successfully negotiated 
with the employers for a wage increase for the mechanics. By the end of the Second World War, 
the Institute had thus established itself as a responsible and effective representative, and 
spokesman, for labour. With its members now numbering about 4,500 and many more supporters 
among mechanics and other workers, it had the resources, the experience and connections to take 
up an influential position in labour's confrontation with management. 
 
But while the Institute undoubtedly made a significant contribution in organizing and co-
ordinating industrial actions, the unity of the workers was in the first place facilitated by the 
structure of employment in the second half of the 1940s. 
 
Before 1950, Hong Kong's economy was characterized by slow technological change, the 
prevalence of traditional methods of learning a trade, and comparatively little industrial 
diversification. Most technical skills and crafts were learned in the workplace from experienced 
workers. As England (1979:85) describes it, 'each method involved a process of socialization 
lasting over a number of years into the norms not only of the craft but of a particular workplace'. 
This lengthy period of learning on the job, together with the plentiful supply of labour from 
neighbouring Kwantung, meant that workers tended to hold onto a job for as long as possible. 
Labour turnover was therefore low and employment stable. At the same time, the lack of 
industrial diversification led to the concentration of the labour force in the strategic sectors such 
as docks, transport and shipping, printing and the public utilities. The continuity of employment 
and the concentration of labour facilitated the communication and hence the unity and 
organization of the workers. It is further worth noting that mechanics accounted for a substantial 
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number of the work force of the time. In 1947, out of a total of some 50,000 workers in 
registered employments, around 15,000 were mechanics in various industries and occupations.4 
This enhanced both the influence of the Chinese Engineers' Institute among workers as well as 
its legitimacy and capacity to co-ordinate and mobilize workers in their struggles against 
management. It is in these economic and organizational contexts that the strikes in the immediate 
post-war years occurred. 
 
 
The Main Events 
 
1946 began with a series of strikes aimed primarily at wage increases. The Labour Office Report 
of the time attributed the cause of the majority of these disputes to 'economic difficulties due to 
high cost of living'. The scale and the rapid succession of industrial actions in the year, however, 
have to be understood also in terms of the organizational nexus of the workers. It is perhaps 
natural that with the concentration of workers in the dockyards, the first and largest strikes of 
1946 occurred among the dockers of the Taikoo Dock and the HM Naval yard, respectively in 
February and March and involving 2,000 and 9,000 strikers. But the social networks and co-
operative efforts of the workers in collective action are best demonstrated in the several 
industrial disputes in public utility companies between May and the end of July. 
 
The public utility strikes started in May among gas workers. A rapid succession of strikes 
followed: the Hong Kong Electric Company workers' strike in the same month, the China Light 
and Power Company workers' strike in June, and the Star Ferry and Hong Kong and Yaumati 
Ferry workers' strike in July. The rapport among the workers and the leading position of the 
Chinese Engineers' Institute during these months of struggle are evident from the following 
excerpts of a letter from the Institute, addressed to the general public and fellow workers during 
the height of the electrical workers' strike. Describing striking as 'a most unfortunate and 
regrettable event', the letter continues: 
 
'Dear workers, the unfortunate has now happened. We must sympathize with and 
support our fellow workers involved in the struggle. ... On the request of the 
Labour Office, our Institute has taken part in negotiations. The Institute will carry 
out its tasks in an undaunted spirit, and we hope that all fellow workers will give 
us their unanimous moral support.' (Letter published in Wah Kiu Yat Po,  22 May 
1946). 
 
And support the strikers of the public utility companies did receive in plenty from labour unions 
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and the public. Apart from offering monetary and rice donations, a number of labour unions also 
sent representatives to work with the Institute in negotiating with the Labour Office and 
managements for settlement of the disputes. The co-operative spirit among workers in further 
demonstrated in two joint letters from 31 labour unions to government urging for a speedy 
resolution of the strikes in the China Light and Power Company and the two Ferry Companies. 
 
If the unity of workers is best illustrated in the case of the public utility strikes, the pervasiveness 
of the impact of economic hardship on the working class in general is evidenced by the wide 
variety of occupational groups (e.g. cinema mechanics, paint and lacquer company workers, the 
fire brigade) which resorted to strikes to bargain for wage increases. Indeed, economic hardship 
was to continue to be the main cause of industrial disputes well into 1947. After that the growth 
of the textile industry and the rise of politicized labour unions were to gradually alter the pattern 
and nature of industrial conflicts. 
 
In terms of industrial relations, 1947 is remembered primarily for the mechanics' strike, also 
referred to as the Chinese Engineers' Institute strike. The Annual Report of the Commissioner of 
Labour, 1948, carries this analysis of the causes of the strike: 
 
'It is very difficult to separate clearly the various causes which led to this strike. 
They were by no means entirely economic, though the demand made by the union 
(the Chinese Engineers' Institute) was a straight-forward demand for an increase 
in basic wages. The main difficulty in the early stages was that the union would 
not apply its demand to specific groups of employers, but persisted in putting 
forward a claim for 150 per cent increase in basic wages for all skilled craftsmen 
throughout the Colony. There was no doubt that this vagueness was largely the 
result of the fact that the union itself was seeking to re-establish its position as the 
representative of all skilled artisans, a position which had apparently been 
weakened by the growth of various industrial unions whose claim to represent all 
workers in a particular undertaking cut across the jurisdiction of the Chinese 
Engineers' Institute ... '. 
 
What is noteworthy in this account, apart from the economic hardship which prompted the strike, 
is the challenge generated by emergent developments in trade unionism to the Institute's claim to 
representativeness. It was on such grounds that representatives from government and from 
employers disputed the status of the Institute as the spokesman of the workers during the strike, 
and insisted on separate bargaining with individual labour unions. This event signified the 
rupturing of the co-operative relationship between the Institute and the government in the 
settlement of industrial disputes and contributed to the decline of the Institute's influence in 
industrial relations in subsequent years. 
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But for the time being the Institute had the fervent support of the workers, as evidenced in the 
meeting called by the Institute on 10 August, a few days before the outbreak of the strike. Some 
400 labour representatives from various occupations attended the meeting to discuss actions to 
be taken against managements. The unity of the workers is reflected in the following excerpts 
from the representatives' statements at the meeting (reported in Wah Kiu Yat Po, 11 August 
1947): 
 
'Though some of the dockyard mechanics have received wage increases, we must 
yet consider the living conditions of all the mechanics as a whole. We should 
follow the instructions of our mother union and be ready to take action when 
required.' (representative from dockyards) 
 
'Irrespective of rank and position, all mechanics should be united to strive for 
success in our present demand for wage increases under the leadership of our 
mother union.' (representative from Kowloon-Canton Railway) 
 
'Mechanics in the Chinese factories should try their best to support their mother 
union in its demands, through direct action and financial assistance if necessary. 
...  Furthermore we must firmly bear in mind the importance of acting in unity 
with the mother union and not allowing ourselves to be divided and defeated.' 
(representative from Hong Kong Chinese Factories) 
 
It was in this spirit of co-operation and unity that the Chinese Engineers' Institute was able to call 
a general strike involving some 11,000 mechanics (over 20 per cent of the workforce in 
registered employments) from 13 occupational groups which included dockers, public utility 
workers, civil servants in water works, dairy farm employees, and hotel workers. The strike 
lasted from 15 August to 11 September, and won for the workers a 50 per cent increase in basic 
wages. However such concerted industrial action of the labouring class in a non-political 
struggle to pursue their goals did not occur again in subsequent years. 
 
The 1940s ended with two important developments in the industrial scene, both related to the 
Civil War in China. The political strife between the Nationalists (i.e. Kuomintang) and the 
Communists in the Mainland led on the one hand to the influx of industrial entrepreneurs and 
capital across the border, and on the other, the formation and consolidation in the Colony of two 
politically-oriented trade union councils, the pro-Communist Federation of Trade Unions 
(established in 1947), and the pro-Kuomintang Trade Union Council (established in 1948). The 
Annual Report of the Commissioner of Labour (for the year ending 31 March 1950) thus 
commented on the impact and implications of these developments: 
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'Many manufacturers from China have transferred their industries to the Colony, 
and in some instances have also brought skilled or unskilled personnel with them. 
Most of the new-comers are ignorant of Hong Kong laws and procedure ... [Even] 
the more modern factory proprietor from China ... is apt to look upon regulations 
and restrictions as unnecessary or unfair.'  (pp. 5-6) 
 
'The political orientation of the majority of unions, particularly those which are 
members of the Hong Kong Federation of Trade Unions, is far too obtrusive. This 
attitude militated against co-operation with the department in a number of 
instances. ...  The Federation has inevitably during the year gained considerably in 
local influence owing to its affinity with the party now in power in China. ...  On 
the other hand the current political situation in China has had the effect of 
curtailing the activities and diminishing the influence of the Trade Union 
Council.'  (pp. 19-20) 
 
These comments indeed reflected well the major changes in the nature and pattern of industrial 
conflict in the last two years of the 1940s. The 1948-9 Annual Report of the Commissioner of 
Labour, for instance, remarked that 'the greatest degree of unrest characterized the spinning 
industry, which is largely in the hands of employers from Shanghai who make use of skilled and 
semi-skilled labour brought from that city' (p. 44). The same report attributed the main causes of 
the unrest to the employers' fierce distrust of all forms of workers' unions, excessive bonus 
demands from workers newly engaged from Shanghai, differences of language and 
incompatibility of temperament between indigenous Cantonese workers and Shanghai 
managements. These factors together with the more conventional disputes over wages, laying off 
of workers, and working conditions gave rise to 11 strikes in the textile industry in 1948 and 
1949 out of a total of 25 for all industries. But this predominance of 'textile' strikes has to be 
accounted for also in the background of the rapid growth of the industry in the last few years of 
the decade. As of 31 March 1947, the textile industry had a registered workforce of 9,328, 
constituting 15 per cent of a total registered workforce of 61,714. By 31 March 1950, it had a 
registered workforce of 24,818, 28 per cent of a total registered workforce of 89,512 (Table 1 of 
the relevant Annual Reports of the Commissioner of Labour). While the whole registered 
working population increased by 45 per cent between the years, that for the textile industry grew 
by 166 per cent. It is also noteworthy that there were no 'textile' strikes in 1946 and 1947. It 
seems obvious that at least for the period concerned, as the textile industry was growing in 
significance in Hong Kong's industrial development, so was its share in industrial conflict. 
 
The 'textile' strikes appear to reflect genuine difficulties in the labour-management relationship. 
The same cannot be said without reservations about those other strikes which involved member-
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unions of the Federation of Trade Unions. The Commissioner of Labour described these strikes 
as 'labour disputes where politics dominates economics' (Annual Report ending 31 March 1950: 
p. 50) and stated that many of the behind-the-scenes advisers in these strikes 'were suspected to 
have been in close touch as to policy with labour bodies in Canton and on the Chinese mainland 
generally' (p. 49). For the year ending 31 March 1950, such strikes led to an estimated loss of 
159,730 man-days, around 88 per cent of the year's total. The Hong Kong Tramway workers' 
strike, the largest of the year, gives an idea of the extent of influence of the Federation of Trade 
Unions. 
 
The strike originated in the Tramway workers' demand for an increase of $3 a day in the cost of 
living allowance around the beginning of December 1949. After fruitless negotiations with the 
management, the workers, under the auspices of the Tramways Union (a member of the 
Federation of Trade Unions), started a 'go slow' strike on Christmas Day. Cars were run to 
normal schedule but conductors did not collect any fares. This sparked off a series of industrial 
disputes in several companies where the workers' unions were affiliated to the FTU. These 
included the Hong Kong Telephone Company, the Hong Kong Electric Company, China Light 
and Power Company, Hong Kong and China Gas Company, the two bus companies, and the 
Dairy Farm Company. Some 3,000 workers of these companies held a joint meeting with the 
Tramways workers on 28 December in which they declared their unity of purpose and 
announced their demand for an increase of $3 a day in the cost of living allowance from their 
companies. Calling themselves the 'six tigers and one cow' (to symbolize the six utility industries 
and the Dairy Farm Company), they pledged to take collective action if the companies did not 
give in to their demands. The Tramway Company management reacted by refusing to allow any 
cars to leave the depot after the Christmas holidays, and dismissing some 600 conductors who 
had taken part in the 'go slow'. At the same time, the management posted notices offering re-
employment to any of the traffic staff who came forward to register their names. The Tramway 
workers thereupon announced their decision to stop all tramway traffic by placing themselves on 
the tracks should the management re-employ staff to run the cars. In any case no worker turned 
up for registration with the company, and tramway traffic came to a standstill, with around 1,750 
Tramway workers participating in the strike. The confrontation came to a climax when in the 
evening of 30 January 1950 a violent clash occurred when the police attempted to break up a 
meeting of the strikers and the supporters, numbering over 1,000, outside the premises of the 
Tramways Union. In the estimate of the Union (reported in the 31 January issue of the Wah Kiu 
Yat Po), some 100 workers were injured, and around a dozen arrested, during the clash. Several 
leaders of the Tramways Union, including the Chairman, were subsequently deported for 
breaches of peace and order. 
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Meanwhile, the other utility and the Dairy Farm workers were continuing their negotiations with 
managements and threatening to strike. A breakthrough came when the Dairy Farm workers and 
the management agreed to settle the dispute through the arbitration of a tribunal to be set up by 
the Governor of Hong Kong. In early February the tribunal announced its decision to offer the 
workers an additional cost of living allowance of $30 a month. This offer was accepted by the 
workers and the management of the Dairy Farm Company, and later by those of the utility 
companies. The Tramway workers returned to work on 10 February. 
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3. UNION RIVALRIES AND INDUSTRIAL PEACE: 1950-9 
 
Overview 
 
As indicated in the summary Tables 3 and 4, the 1950s were a period of industrial peace. All the 
strike indices reflect a dramatic decline in the level of strikes and the propensity to strike. The 
decline is best summarized in the 'number of man-days lost per 1,000 workers'.  The annual 
average for 1950-9 (278) is only about one-tenth the figure for 1946-9 (2,765). 
 
Given the high level of industrial conflict in the immediate post-war years, and the militant 
attitude of the left-wing Federation of Trade Unions towards the end of the 1940s, the reverse 
trend is puzzling. Explanations have been offered in a number of authoritative studies of 
industrial relations in Hong Kong (e.g. England 1979, England and Rear 1981, Turner et al. 
1980). While these explanations provide useful guidelines for an interpretation of industrial 
relations in the 1950s, they have not been substantiated with a detailed analysis of the relevant 
empirical data. In the following discussion, we shall examine these explanations against the 
empirical background, and identify the major factors that contributed to industrial peace in the 
decade. 
 
Change in the tactics of the FTU is one central explanation in both England's (1979) and Turner's 
(1980) studies. England thus writes: 
 
'With the post-revolutionary peace, British recognition of the People's Republic 
in 1950, and a tacit understanding between Britain and China over the status of 
Hong Kong, a period of trade union calm followed. The Communist unions in the 
Colony largely concentrated upon providing welfare benefits for their members 
rather than collective bargaining' (1979:94). 
 
Turner, on the other hand, attributes the change in tactics to the left-wing unions' lack of success 
in attaining the basic objectives of strikes in the late 1940s. The subsequent disaffection among 
the strikers and breakaways from the leadership of the FTU made it imperative for the Federation 
'to concentrate on replenishing its strength by building up its educational, cultural and welfare 
services to members' (1980:91). 
 
Both writers thus suggest that the tactics of the FTU and of the left-wing unions was guided 
largely by political considerations - political events in Mainland China and the political strength 
of the FTU in Hong Kong. Later events show that such considerations have been important 
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determining factors in the development of the trade union movement and of industrial relations 
in Hong Kong. The 1950s were a period of intense rivalry between the FTU and the ring-wing 
Trade Union Council in their competition for membership and support. The primary objective of 
both organizations was image building and their target group was not just the working class but 
the whole community. Other measures than militant industrial action were deemed more 
effective  in winning over the public. Industrial action thus receded into the background and was 
supported only insofar as it helped to boost the organization's public image and political status. 
 
Changes in the economy and the structure of employment in the 1950s contributed further to the 
decline of industrial action. The first half of the decade was a period of high unemployment due 
to a combination of factors. Restrictions imposed by the Government of the United States on the 
export of raw materials to Hong Kong, and keen competition from Japan and other Asian 
countries for international markets, forced many local factories to close down or reduce their 
staff. The employment situation was also aggravated by the influx of refugees from Mainland 
China in the late 1940s and the early 1950s. Surplus labour weakened the bargaining power of 
workers and had the effect of dampening industrial action. From the mid-1950s, however, local 
manufacturers were able to secure the import of raw materials from new sources and were 
competing successfully in international markets. The economy revived, with many new 
industries emerging and expanding rapidly, to the extent that towards the end of the decade the 
Colony was facing a shortage of labour. But now the speed of industrial growth and the 
diversification of employment outstripped the organizational capacities of workers' unions. 
 
Further, employment in the public utility companies and the shipbuilding industry - the 
strongholds of the FTU - was increasing at a much lower rate than in the fast growing textile and 
plastic goods industries. As shown in Table 5, the growth of employment in the public utility 
companies and the shipbuilding industry between 1955 and 1960 was only 2 per cent, while that 
in the textile industry was 173 per cent, and in the plastic goods industry 1,666 per cent. By the 
end of the decade, the public utility and shipbuilding industries were employing 13,844 workers, 
6 per cent of a total registered labour force of 228,929; the textile and plastic goods industries 
together had 123,677 employees, 54 per cent of the registered labour force. With this drastic 
change in employment, recruiting members from the rapidly expanding industrial sectors 
through welfare services and educational programmes became the top priority of the FTU, 
especially when its rival the TUC was making a similar move. 
 
In the 1950s as in later years, the orientations of the FTU and TUC had an immense influence on 
the development of the trade union movement and of industrial relations in Hong Kong. The 
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predominance of small workers' unions make it difficult for a strong politically independent 
labour movement to develop in juxtaposition to the FTU and TUC which had material and 
ideological support from their political patrons. In 1953, for instance, there were 226 registered 
workers' unions, around 60 per cent of which had a registered membership of below 251, and 
close to 90 per cent had a registered membership of below 1,001 (Annual Report, Labour 
Department, 1953-4:115-27, Table 10). The Commissioner of Labour thus commented on the 
consequences of this for trade unionism in Hong Kong: 
 
'The number of workers' organizations on the register is far in excess of the real 
needs of the Colony and is in no way indicative of progressive trade unionism, but 
may to some extent be explained by political, demographic and lingual 
differences. ... During the year a number of new so-called "free" unions were 
organized, most of them by breakaway elements in unions affiliated to the 
Federation of Trade Unions. At first there were indications that a "centre force" 
free of political domination might emerge, but this has failed to materialize. By 
the end of the year most of the new unions were affiliated to or otherwise closely 
associated with the Trade Union Council, the right-wing KMT-influenced 
federation. It is not difficult to understand why this should be so: most of the new 
unions are weak in membership and therefore poor financially; under pressure 
they have allied themselves with the organization which can offer the most 
acceptable protection.' (Annual Report 1952-3:31-2) 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table 5: Number of Persons Employed in Registered Industrial Establishments (Number 
of establishments in brackets) 
 
                                31 March 1955       31 March 1960 
 
Public utilities (including  
electricity, gas, steam, 
motor buses, tramways,                 4,175  5,135 
and telephone)                                   (9)         (9) 
 
Shipbuilding and repairing             7,217     8,709 
                                                 (21)     (30) 
 
Textiles                                        39,880 108,770 
                                              (693)   (1,456) 
 
Plastic toys and flowers                  844   14,907 
                                     (43)     (363) 
                                                                        
Source: Hong Kong Statistics 1947-67:56-62, Table 4.3 (Census and Statistics Department, 
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Hong Kong 1969)  
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
This pattern of breaking away from one political wing and joining the other continued through 
the 1950s. By 31 March 1956, about 70 per cent of the workers' unions were affiliated to either 
one of the two federations. At the end of the decade, of the 245 workers' unions, 90 (38 per cent) 
were affiliated or friendly to the FTU, and 118 (48 per cent) to the TUC. The rivalry between the 
two federations and their affiliates sapped the strength of the labour movement and eclipsed to 
some extent the confrontation between labour and management. But the lapse of industrial action 
has to be explained also against the background of Hong Kong's industrialization. 
 
The 1950s were a period of industrial adjustment and take-off in Hong Kong. The United 
Nations' embargo on the entry of strategic goods to China seriously jeopardized the Colony's 
entrepot trade, and local entrepreneurs were forced to divert their resources to manufacture. By 
the mid-50s the Commissioner of Labour was reporting that 'local industry continued to expand 
at a high and sustained rate' (1955-6 Annual Report:7). Further, most of the burgeoning 
industries required a low level of skills and thus provided workers with plenty of opportunities 
for alternative employment should they be dissatisfied with the incumbent one.5 This easy 
mobility of labour across industries acted as the safety valve for industrial relations, and through 
neutralizing workers' discontents, was one crucial underlying factor in industrial peace in the 
1950s. In addition, the fifties were a period of stable and declining prices with wage rates 
fluctuating within a narrow range through much of the decade.6 This also contributed to the 
acquiescence among the labour force. 
 
 
The Main Events 
 
Most of the strikes in the first three years of the decade involved few workers and were of a short 
duration. Only two of the 15 strikes had more than 200 participants, and only two lasted longer 
than 20 days. At a time of economic recession, the strikes arose typically from the workers' 
protests against reduction in wages and hours of work. None of the disputes involved public 
utility workers, and this suggests that the left-wing unions were recuperating and reconsidering 
its tactics after their confrontation with management at the end of the previous decade. Two 
strikes warrant a closer examination for the magnitude of the dispute and the information they 
provide on the general situation of workers' unions at the time. 
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The strike in the I-Feng Enamel Factory (lasting from 16-25 February 1952 and involving 692 
workers) originated from workers' demands on a wage increase and improvement on working 
conditions. The management reacted by dismissing eight worker representatives who were 
members of the left-wing Hong Kong and Kowloon Enamel Workers General Union. A partial 
strike followed and the management declared a lock-out and closed the factory. While this was 
going on, a section of the workers who were dissatisfied with the leadership of the Enamel 
Workers General Union decided to form a new union and were negotiating a return to work with 
the management. A propaganda campaign in the left-wing newspapers immediately followed, 
accusing the management and some 'traitors of the working class' as conspiring to form a fake 
labour union in the hope of destroying the solidarity of workers. The following quotation from a 
lengthy commentary entitled 'How were fake labour unions formed?' in the Man Wui Po 
illustrates the typical rhetoric used by left-wing factions against the alleged renegades and their 
supporters:  
 
'Capitalist employers in various enterprises ... now realize that in order to apply 
new exploitative measures against workers, they must first instigate fake labour 
organizations as a foundation. These employers can then make use of these 
organizations as representatives of "all workers" to accept the new measures, thus 
depriving the original labour unions of their legal status and rights. For this 
reason, capitalist employers have recently bought off a minority of labour thieves 
to set up fake unions, which are applying for registration with the Labour 
Department. The Labour Department not only accepts their application, but also 
recognizes their status as labour unions. Yet all workers are of the opinion that 
this deed of the Labour Department is in violation of the law, a deed which no 
worker will tolerate' (17 February 1952). 
 
The commentary then continued to describe the composition of these fake unions as consisting 
mainly of the following categories of people: traitors who had collaborated with the Japanese 
army during the war, remnants and running dogs of the Kuomintang, and heads and members of 
triad societies. Side by side with this and other similar commentaries were reports on monetary 
donations from workers in China in support of the struggle against capitalist exploitation and 
colonial oppression in Hong Kong.7 The political messages are obvious. The left-wing factions 
had larger objectives than just confronting management in industrial disputes. Meanwhile, 
amidst the intense propaganda in the left-wing press, a new labour union was formed in the I-
Feng Enamel Factory, which reopened after a few days of stoppage of work. 
 
A similar course of events happened in the labour dispute in the Wah Keong Rubber Factory (24 
November 1951-25 March 1952, with 360 strikers). In this case, wage demands from the left-
wing Rubber and Plastic Workers' Union led to a stoppage of work. When workers belonging to 
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the right-wing Rubber Shoe Workers Union returned to work after a successful negotiation with 
the management, confrontations between the two rival labour factions took place outside the 
factory premises. The Commissioner of Labour described the confrontations as follows: 
 
'The Rubber and Plastic Workers' Union ... picketed the factory with over 100 
pickets, a number of whom, it was later discovered, were not members of the 
union or connected with the trade but were specially hired for these duties. The 
picketing was intense and police supervision was necessary to prevent serious 
breaches of the peace, but the returning workers refused to be intimidated and 
countered the picketing by entering and leaving the factory in a body' (Annual 
Report 1951-2:39-40). 
 
The picketing continued for about two months, during which time the Federation of Trade 
Unions organized extensive 'Comfort Missions' which supplied food, clothing, umbrellas and 
stools to the pickets, and the left-wing press carried on an intensive campaign against the 
adversaries. 
 
The pattern of small, short strikes in the first three years of the decade was followed by the 
occurrence of two large-scale strikes in 1953-4, a year which is conspicuous in having the 
second lowest number of strikes but the largest number of man-days lost in the decade. This 
anomaly was due to the fact that both strikes - one involving crews of the fishing junks, the other 
involving rattan workers - originated from disputes over wage agreements which applied to the 
whole industry. The rattan workers' strike is noteworthy in that it was initiated by a right-wing 
labour union whose destructive tactics entailed action by the police. The left-wing union, in 
contrast, adopted a moderate attitude and negotiated a settlement with the management, and the 
left-wing press urged the workers to accept the employers' offers, 'in the interests of all parties 
concerned'.8 
 
With industrial revival and changes in the structure of employment from the mid-50s, dismissals 
of union representatives and of redundant workers in certain declining industries replaced wage 
demands as the main cause of industrial disputes. The rival unions continued to vie for 
leadership and public support by discrediting the industrial action of the other as irresponsible 
and detrimental to the interests of the community. Such tactics apparently had the effect of 
curtailing strikes, as demonstrated in the Tramway workers' dispute of 1954. In July the 
Tramways Company dismissed on grounds of redundancy 31 employees, amongst whom several 
were leaders of the left-wing Tramways Workers Union. After unsuccessful negotiations with 
the management and the Labour Department, the Union called a token strike of two hours on 31 
August, which was ignored by workers belonging to the right-wing Victoria Tramways Free 
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Workers Union. Failing to achieve their objective in the first attempt, the left-wing faction called 
a second strike on 10 October (the national day of Nationalist China), a symbolic challenge to 
the pro-Kuomintang unions. On the same day a partial token strike of 15 minutes' duration was 
staged by left-wing workers of the China Motor Bus Company in support of the Tramway 
strikers. The right-wing workers refused to join in the strikes and returned to work amidst intense 
picketing. At the same time the two factions escalated their propaganda campaign in the press. 
The following press report in the pro-Kuomintang Wah Kiu Yat Po is illustrative of the counter 
measures used by the right-wing faction against its rival. Captioned 'Statement from free 
Tramway workers', the report says: 
 
'Key members [of the left-wing Tramway Workers Union] have in their open 
letters to all workers maliciously attacked our union through lies and extortion, 
attempting thereby to intimidate us in our just and free action. ... We know well 
that in calling a strike, these people are trying to safeguard the position of a few 
so-called union leaders and not serving the interests of workers. Since 1952, the 
Tramways Company has dismissed several batches of workers on different 
occasions, but no action was taken by the Tramway Workers Union. By contrast, 
therefore, this union's recent industrial action reflects clearly its sole concern with 
upholding the privileges of a minority to the neglect of the rights of the majority 
of workers. ... We are determined to stand firm in our dedication to lead the just 
and free Tramway workers to perform their duties responsibly. We will not take 
part in any action that for selfish motives would jeopardize the workers' 
employment' (20 October 1954). 
 
That the Tramway workers' strikes did not develop into protracted labour disputes was probably 
attributable to the lack of support among workers and the unwillingness of the FTU to alienate 
the public. A press report in the 11 October issue of the Man Wui Po carried this captioned 
announcement: 'In the interests of the public, tramway workers have decided to resume work 
from today'. 
 
In this situation in which rival unions refused to co-operate in industrial action and used the 
rhetoric of 'public interests' to discredit the other, strikes on the whole remained localized and 
small-scale for the next few years.9 The latter part of the decade, however, was characterized by 
a number of new developments in industrial conflict. The changeover in several factories from a 
system of two shifts to one of three shifts in order to increase production gave rise to minor 
labour disputes leading to strikes. Towards the end of the decade, the phenomenal growth of the 
textile industry, over which the FTU was gaining an increasing influence, made this industry the 
most strike-prone sector in local industries. Ten of the 17 strikes that occurred between 1958 and 
1960 were in the textile industry, causing a loss of 25,822 man-days (85 per cent of the total). 
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Finally, wage increases granted to civil servants on the recommendations of the 1959 Civil 
Service Salaries Commission led to widespread demands for comparable increases in the private 
sector. Such demands gave rise to an upsurge of strikes in the last year of the decade. It appears 
that industrialization and a rapidly growing economy were generating higher expectations and 
greater demands among the workforce. The 1960s began with this new challenge in industrial 
relations. 
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4. STAGNATION IN UNION GROWTH AND INDUSTRIAL PEACE: 1960-6 
 
The Hong Kong economy in 1960-6 was characterized by a labour shortage and a steady rise in 
the cost of living, both of which were the results of rapid economic growth in the previous 
decade. Labour scarcity enhances the bargaining power of workers. Rising prices generate 
discontents. These are factors that threaten the stability of industrial relations. Yet the period 
under review was one of remarkable industrial peace. Though the absolute level of strikes (see 
the summary Tables 3 and 4) is higher than that in the 1950s, the increase was due to the 
expansion of the workforce. The decline in the propensity to strike indicates that the workers 
were less inclined to strike than in the previous decade. Obviously there were conditions that 
offset the two aforementioned contributing factors to strikes. 
 
The weakness of the trade union movement became more pronounced from the early 1960s. In 
addition to the political opposition and rivalry between the two labour federations, there was a 
noticeable drop in union membership, and more significantly, in the proportion of the workforce 
who belonged to labour unions (see Table 6). The reasons for this decline are not clear, though 
an explanation has been offered that at a time of full employment and increasing wages the 
workers did not feel they needed the help of unions.10 It is also possible that the workers were 
dissatisfied with the political manoeuvres of the labour organizations. Thus, instead of pursuing 
their goals through collective action, many workers attempted individualist solutions to their 
problems. 
 
Industrial peace was also very much the result of the continuing non-militant policies of the two 
labour federations. The FTU, in particular, often refrained from direct involvement in industrial 
disputes. Joe England attributed this to the left-wing faction's 'desire to maintain the economic 
stability of Hong Kong from which China derived a substantial proportion of her foreign 
exchange' (1979:30). As shown in Table 7, the involvement of labour organizations in strikes 
declined from the mid-1950s and continued to remain at a low level in the first half of the 1960s. 
 
Table 6: Trade Union Membership and Density 1960-6 
 
Year ending    Number of Unions    Declared Membership     Union 
              (approximate figures)     Density*                                             
 
 1960 239 217300 94.9 
 1961 237 165000 71.8 
 1962 241 159500 57.3 
 1963 238 142480 47.1 
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 1964 239 149680 42.3 
 1965 242 166900 46.7 
 1966 240 171620 45.6 
                                                                        
 
* Declared membership as a percentage of all workers employed in registered establishments. 
 
Source: Chiu (1987:203) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Strikes With Labour Union Involvement, 1946-66 
(in percentages) 
                                                                        
 1946-50  57 
 1951-55  57 
 1956-60  32 
 1961-66  36 
                                                                        
 
Source: Chiu (1987:220). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Wage increases and the easy availability of employment opportunities also contributed to 
industrial peace. Between March 1958 and March 1967, average wages for the industrial 
workforce increased by 102 per cent.11 In many cases the increases were made by employers 
unilaterally or in prompt response to the demands of workers. The 'credit', as England observed 
(1979:91-2), thus went to the employers and to the existing economic system, not to the labour 
unions. This must have contributed significantly to the stagnation in union growth and to the 
compliant and collaborationist orientations of the workforce. Further, the rapidly expanding 
economy and the resourcefulness and adaptability of the workforce meant that alternative 
employment opportunities could easily be found to accommodate the retrenched or dissatisfied 
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workers.  The following excerpts from from the Wah Kiu Yat Po provide illustrations of the 
coping efforts and orientations of the workers under such circumstances.  A report captioned 
'Retrenched workers make a living through their own efforts' observes: 
 
'Through the assistance of their former employers, these workers borrowed some 
sewing machines which they operated at home, in the alleys, or on roof-tops. ... 
They manufactured mainly shirts, clothes for children and pyjamas, catering to 
local markets. At the same time they made arrangements with street-side stalls to 
have their products sold there. Their commodities are of good quality and low 
prices, and they are thus doing good business. ... Co-operative arrangements of 
this kind are now spreading among retrenched workers.' (26 May 1961) 
 
Another report states: 
 
'Newly opened hotels, restaurants, cafes and shops of various sizes are absorbing 
a large number of workers. Industrial workers with personal connections could 
easily find employment in these business organizations. ... There are also small 
shops operated under the joint capital and efforts of retrenched workers, or run 
with financial assistance from former employers. Through such means, the 
workers manage to live through difficult times.' (13 June 1961) 
 
 
The Main Events 
 
The decade started in the wake of salary increases granted to civil servants on the 
recommendations of the 1959 Salaries Commission. For a time, industrial disputes in the private 
sector seemed imminent as wide-spread demands for wage increases of equivalent proportions to 
those granted to government officers spread to most industries and trades. The co-operative 
efforts of the labour unions, and economic prosperity, which enabled many employers to satisfy 
promptly the demands of the workers, averted a general eruption of industrial conflict. The 
Commissioner of Labour wrote:  
 
'Management and labour, generally, made genuine efforts to reach settlements by 
negotiation. ... An extensive upward  adjustment in the whole wage structure of 
Hong Kong occurred in 1960 involving an average increase in pay of 
approximately 15 per cent. This change was made in a period of prosperity and 
took place with a negligible loss of man-days through strikes and lock-outs. ... 
Several unions made considerable contributions to the amicable settlement of 
wage negotiations.' (Annual Report 1960-1:6-7) 
 
The resolution of disputes in some cases, however, was obstructed by the existence of rival  
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unions in the same industry, and their insistence on separate negotiations with management 
complicated and prolonged the process of negotiation. This was well exemplified in the strike in 
the carved furniture industry. The left-wing Hong Kong and Kowloon Woodwork Carvers Union 
resorted to strike action in mid-May 1960 when negotiations on wage increases broke down. The 
dispute was settled 10 days later with the management agreeing to increases of 20 per cent in 
piece rates and $1 for daily rates. These terms, however, were not acceptable to the right-wing 
Hong Kong and Kowloon Camphor Wood Trunk Workers Union, who called a strike in early 
June. After a further 32 days' stoppage of work, the union succeeded in getting increases of 22 
per cent in piece rates and $1 for daily rates. Together the two strikes led to a loss of 19,750 
man-days, almost 70 per cent of the year's total. A similar situation occurred in the dispute in the 
Fung Keong Rubber Manufactory Ltd., where the management and the Labour Department had 
to negotiate separately with one left-wing and two right-wing unions in the industry. The strike 
lasted for only one day, but a total of 25 meetings took place in the Labour Department over the 
dispute. This pattern of multiple negotiations and revisions with different unions, which 
inevitably increased the time and effort in conflict resolution, was to repeat itself through the rest 
of the period. 
 
After the general wage increases of 1960, the following year was one of remarkable industrial 
peace, though residual wage demands generated a few isolated small-scale strikes. Signs of 
unrest among the workforce, however, began to show towards the end of 1962 and in early 1963, 
when the Report on the Survey of Government Wages and Salaries was in preparation. There 
was a general feeling among workers that they were experiencing a decline in the standards of 
living owing to an increase in living costs - principally uncontrolled rents - which had 
outstripped the wage increases at the start of the decade. The Survey, apparently, heightened 
their awareness and gave them the occasion to convey the message. The Commissioner of 
Labour reported 'a wave of wage demands which, by the end of the year (1962), had spread to 
shipyards, Government Departments, port work (stevedores, tallyclerks and ship painters), ship-
breaking and building construction' (Annual Report 1962-3:29). Awards of pay increases to the 
staff of the Star Ferry and the Hong Kong and Yaumati Ferry Companies and the announcement 
of substantial increases in pay for police rank and file towards the end of the year gave further 
impetus to wage demands from labour unions. The right-wing Hong Kong Stevedores Union led 
the way by demanding a number of improvements in the terms of employment, including an 
increase of $3 in the daily pay, in January 1963. The move was motivated by economic as well 
as political considerations, as the Chairman of the union was concurrently the Chairman of the 
TUC; the Council would enhance its prestige if one of its affiliates succeeded in securing a 
substantial wage increase for its members. The dispute and strike which eventually won a 37.5 
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per cent wage increase had the anticipated demonstration effect. Wage demands and strikes from 
right-wing unions followed in February in the ship-breaking, and the ship-painting and scraping 
industries. In March, the left-wing Hong Kong Ship Paint-Scrapers and Painters Union also put 
forth their wage demands of a 37.5 per cent increase. Despite similar demands, the management 
held separate negotiations with the unions, and accepted their demands in full by the end of 
March. 
 
The Report on the Survey of Government Wages and Salaries was published on 1 April 1963. Its 
controversial conclusions, which estimated the increase in the cost of living between 1958 and 
1962 to be 3.5-5 per cent for labourers and artisans, and between 1959 and 1962 to be 5-9 per 
cent for white-collar staff, were considered by the workers to have grossly under-represented the 
actual increase. In view of the fact that there had been a 15 per cent wage increase for most 
industries in 1960 alone, the Report gave no justification for the workforce to press for further 
wage increases. Contesting the validity of the Report, the workers presented their own estimates. 
The following excerpts from the Wah Kiu Yat Po show the huge discrepancies between the 
official estimates and theirs. 
 
'The Report on the increase in the cost of living since 1959 has become the daily 
talk of the working class. They were disappointed that after months of 
investigation, the Report produced such unrealistic, factually incorrect, findings. 
... An employee of the bus company, Mr. Lai, indicated that in 1959 his income 
could just meet expenses. But now he has to work extra shifts on top of his 
normal work. Fatigue is his cost for making a living. ... Mr. Lai then listed 
examples of the substantial rise in the cost of living: 
 
Since 1959, (1) rent has gone up ... by 40 per cent, (2) the cost of rice ... by 10 per 
cent, (3) school fees ... by 43 per cent, ... (4) daily necessities for the family by 30 
per cent, ... and (5) clothing by at least 20 per cent. ... 
 
To cope with the rising costs, many of his fellow workers have been forced to 
terminate their children's education. Their hardship is more than words can 
describe.' (Wah Kiu Yat Po, 4 April 1963). 
 
The 12 April issue of the Wah Kiu Yat Po published the survey findings of the staff association 
of the Urban Services Department, with the following conclusion from the association's 
chairman: 
 
'The association's careful survey on the livelihood of its members reveals that the 
minimum monthly expenditure for a family of five is $311. ... Yet the average 
low-income civil servant is earning less than $200 a month. How can they live on 
such meagre income?' 
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This general dissatisfaction with wage levels, and the sense of being let down by the 
government's report on wages and salaries, made 1963 the most strike-prone year of the period. 
Twelve of the year's 17 strikes, or 89 per cent of the man-days lost through strikes, were 
connected with demands for wage increases. The Labour Department's Annual Report described 
the effect of these strikes on wage levels as 'far-reaching', affecting a wide variety of workers in 
both the public and private sectors. The Department estimated the subsequent general increase in 
wages in industry at about 13.5 per cent over the previous year's wage level (Annual Report 
1963-4:15). 
 
A period of industrial calm followed in 1964-5, with a substantial reduction in the number of 
strikes connected with wage demands. The year would have been one of the most peaceful in 
industrial relations if not for the strikes in the artistic woodwork trade, which accounted for 90 
per cent of the year's total man-days lost due to stoppages. 
 
Demands for wage increases were the cause of the artistic woodworkers' strikes. Negotiations 
between the management and the workers were complicated and time-consuming because three 
labour unions (from two rival factions), and a fourth group of dissidents who broke away from 
union leadership, were involved. The demands were first raised by one union on 24 June; the 
final settlement was reached on 29 September. In the interim, the management had to deal with 
different demands (20, 35, 37, and 40 per cent increases in piece rates, and also varying increases 
in daily rates) from different groups of workers on different dates. Except for the dissidents, who 
had a speedy settlement with the management, each union resorted to strike action at its own 
appointed time. The trade had only about 1,800 workers. The disunity of workers could hardly 
be more pronounced than in this incident. 
 
By the beginning of 1965, the rise in the cost of living had apparently caught up with wage 
increases gained in previous years. Awards of pay increases to employees of several government 
departments, including the police force and the Ministry of Public Building and Public Works, 
around the end of 1964 precipitated another wave of wage demands in the private sector. Most of 
the disputes were settled within a short time, with the management agreeing to the workers' wage 
demands. The one exception is the ship painters and scrapers' strikes, which caused a loss of 
54,600 man-days or 84 per cent of the year's total loss due to strikes. The dispute lasted from the 
beginning of April till the end of June, with two rival unions negotiating separately with the 
management and accusing each other of betraying the interests of workers. 
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The pattern of small-scale, sporadic strikes continued through the end of the period. And though 
17 strikes were recorded for 1966-7, the number of workers involved and the number of man-
days lost were just around the average for the whole period; the propensity to strike, moreover, 
was below average. The only two noteworthy industrial actions of the year were the strike in the 
East Asia Textiles Ltd. (117 strikers, 42 days), and that in the Green Island Cement Co. Ltd. (455 
strikers, 24.5 days). There was no foreboding, in the industrial scene or in the Annual Report of 
the Labour Department, that the most pervasive and violent industrial conflict and civil 
disturbances in Hong Kong's post-war history were to follow in 1967. 
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5. POLITICS AND STRIKES: 1967 
 
Introduction 
 
The traumatic disturbances in 1967 are a poignant illustration of the susceptibility of the labour 
movement, and indeed of the Hong Kong Chinese community, to the influence of political events 
in Mainland China. Indigenous developments in Hong Kong in the first half of the 1960s gave no 
signs that minor labour disputes would rapidly escalate into a territory-wide conflict in 1967. 
Between 1961 and 1965 the average annual growth rates in gross domestic products and gross 
domestic products per capital were 13 and 9 per cent respectively.12 Real wage increased by 56 
per cent from a base index of 100 in 1958 to 156 in 1965.13 The period was one of rapid 
economic growth, increasing affluence, and general improvement in the earnings of the working 
population. 
 
But the cost of living rose dramatically from 1966. By the beginning of 1967, it was possible that 
there was a slight decline in real wage for workers in the communication and public utilities 
sectors, where wage increases over the past few years had lagged behind those in the 
manufacturing industries. It was in this context that the riots in April 1966 in protest against the 
Star Ferry fare increases occurred. It would, however, be misleading to interpret the 1967 
disturbances in the light of the previous year's experiences. The Star Ferry riots were 
economically motivated, poorly organized with no trade union involvement, and short-lived. In 
contrast, the 1967 riots were, except in the initial phase, politically oriented protracted struggles 
promoted and engineered by left-wing trade unions. Whatever economic hardship and grievances 
there were among the working class in 1967, they were not of a magnitude that could generate 
and sustain widespread and prolonged confrontations with the management and their alleged 
protectors the colonial government. Nor did developments in industrial relations in the first half 
of the 1960s suggest possibilities of an imminent pervasive rupture between labour and 
management. The left-wing unions had followed a non-militant policy since the early 1950s, and 
their share in total union membership had dropped from 65 per cent in 1961 to 57 per cent by 
1967,14 suggesting a decline in the influence of the Federation of Trade Unions among the 
working class. For more than a decade and a half before 1967, the level of strikes had remained 
low, and the propensity to strike had been declining.15 Indigenous developments indeed offered 
no signs of a drastic and dramatic change in 1967. Across the border in Mainland China, 
however, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was gathering momentum in the first few 
months of 1967. In the same way as the Civil War and the Communist Revolution in China 
precipitated the industrial disputes in Hong Kong in the late 1940s, the Cultural Revolution 
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sparked off nationalist sentiments which fueled and escalated the conflict in the Colony in 1967. 
 
Though the Cultural Revolution was a domestic struggle with the ostensible aim of purging the 
society of recurrent bourgeois, bureaucratic consciousness and practices, it had political 
overtones for international relations. Slogans such as 'The East Wind is stronger than the West 
Wind', attacks by Chinese leaders on 'Soviet revisionism' and 'US imperialism', and descriptions 
of western capitalist regimes as 'paper tigers', carried the implication that Chinese compatriots 
overseas, especially those under colonial rule, should follow the model of their motherland and 
bring the capitalist imperialists to their knees. It was in this context that what started as localized 
industrial disputes rapidly escalated into a territory-wide confrontation between the left-wing 
unions and the symbols of imperialist and capitalist authorities in Hong Kong. 
 
 
The Initial Phase 
  
The influence of the Cultural Revolution was obvious even in the two minor labour disputes 
around the end of April which started the traumatic disturbances continuing through the end of 
the year. The usual labour-oriented grievances - problems over bonus payments and an alleged 
assault on workers by two European engineers in the Green Island Cement Factory in Hung 
Hom, and disputes over hours of work, wages, and the dismissal of workers in the Hong Kong 
Artifical Flower Works at San Po Kong and in Western District - led to demonstrations by the 
affected workers at the factory sites. It was evident in the ensuing confrontation between labour 
and management in the next few days that the protesting workers, many of whom members of 
left-wing unions, were backing up their demands with larger political forces. John Cooper in his 
detailed account of the 1967 disturbances thus describes the responses of the protesters outside 
the Artificial Flower Works at San Po Kong when the police intervened: 
 
'As they were led away to police vehicles the arrested men hurled abuse, shouted 
communist slogans, and a few of their number banished aloft copies of Mao Tse-
tung's quotations ... ' (1970:6). 
 
The demonstrators at the Green Island Cement Factory, meanwhile, had their morale boosted by 
the visit of a left-wing organized 'Comfort Mission', with a supporting cast of three local film 
stars. 
 
The presence of the police at the sites of disorder apparently speeded up the politicization of the 
labour disputes. Strikers at the Artificial Flower Works soon put up 'big character' posters at the 
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factory gates condemning the British authorities in Hong Kong for using force to suppress the 
workers and advising the Hong Kong Government to desist from becoming the 'stooge of the 
American imperialists'. 
 
Meanwhile the left-wing press voiced their support for the strikers, condemned the intervention 
of the British authorities in the labour disputes, and accused management of using pro-
Kuomintang elements against workers. On 12 May, the disturbances spread beyond the sites of 
the original disputes as crowds of people took to the street in many parts of Kowloon in defiance 
of the police and the colonial authorities. Protests and rioting followed in the next few days on 
Hong Kong Island. By the middle of May, it had become obvious that a major political 
disturbance was imminent. 
 
 
 
The Formation of Struggle Organizations 
 
As the unrest mounted, the Federation of Trade Unions acted promptly to establish the 
organizational framework to co-ordinate the struggle. On its initiative, representatives from 
twelve leftist groups met on 12 May to establish the All Trades Struggle Committee (ATSC). 
The Committee urged all Federation affiliates to form struggle units to 'struggle against Hong 
Kong British persecution, to strengthen unity, to call denunciation meetings, to denounce Hong 
Kong British bloody atrocity, and to start extensive money raising' (Ta Kung Pao, 13 May 1967). 
Within a few days, the original 12 ATSC member groups expanded to approximately 40, and the 
left-wing press reported the formation of struggle committees in schools, trade unions, banks and 
other enterprises.16 On 15 May, China's Foreign Ministry issued the first of its statements 
expressing support for the Hong Kong Compatriots and denouncing the 'fascist measures' of the 
Hong Kong Government. Hopes of the leftists in Hong Kong for assistance from the motherland 
were further raised by the Vice-Foreign Minister's declaration on 18 May that China's domestic 
concern with the Cultural Revolution did not prevent 'Chinese care for the righteous struggle of 
the Chinese compatriots in Hong Kong'.17 It was in the midst of such encouraging statements 
from China that a second, more encompassing struggle organization, the All Circles Struggle 
Committee (ACSC), was established in Hong Kong on 16 May.18 Within two days, 126 struggle 
committees were formed under the auspices of the ACSC,19 which then proceeded to arrange 
meetings for representatives from these groups to share their struggle experiences, to study the 
words of Chairman Mao, and to plan for future action. 
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The formation of struggle committees was soon followed by a wave of strikes, some of which 
occurred in government departments. Between 23 May and the end of the month, some 18 short 
strikes took place. The establishments involved included transport and public utility companies 
(the two bus companies, Star Ferry, Yaumati Ferry, China Light and Power), dockyards 
(Whampo Docks, Taikoo Dockyard), government departments (Post Office, Marine Department, 
Water Works Department) textile factories (Nam Fung Textiles, Central Textiles, Wyler 
Textiles) and a number of other enterprises. By the beginning of June, the left-wing press in 
Hong Kong were proclaiming 'a widespread mass movement to oppose national oppression and 
defend national honour'.20 
 
In China, the People's Daily in an important editorial on 3 June called upon the Hong Kong 
compatriots to form a broad revolutionary front and 'be ready at any time to respond to the call of 
the motherland, and smash the reactionary rule of British imperialism'. In response to the 
editorial, widespread rallies were held on the Mainland; the People's Liberation Army border 
garrisons vowed to 'take our place in the forefront of the struggle against British imperialism' as 
soon as the motherland issued instructions.21 Meanwhile the disturbances in Hong Kong 
escalated. By 10 June, strikes had spread to the Hong Kong Electric Company, the China Gas 
Company, Kowloon Wharf, the Government Garage, and the Public Works Department, while 
many of the workers who had resorted to strikes in May intensified their industrial action in a 
new series of strikes in their respective enterprises. As there were yet no signs that the colonial 
authorities and the management were succumbing, the struggle committees now decided to 
increase the pressure through joint efforts. 
 
 
Joint Strike, General Strike, and Trade Suspension 
 
The purpose of the joint strike, which began on 10 June, was to restrict local administration and 
to curtail food supplies to the Colony. On that day it was announced in the left-wing newspapers 
that, in response to the call to strike by four left-wing Government workers' unions, workers in 
various Government Departments would stop work as a protest against Government persecution. 
To the dismay of the struggle committees, almost all Government workers reported for duty. The 
strike at the Dairy Farm in Pokfulam on the same day, however, achieved a least a temporary 
success, as all work was suspended for most of the day. Still, many workers promptly returned to 
work when the company threatened to dismiss those who persisted in their strike action. Another 
strike was to be staged among the 60,000 strong hawker community, but as Cooper observed, the 
instigators 'had in fact chosen a bad day, since 12 June was Dragon Festival time, commonly 
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accepted as an exceedingly good revenue period for all hawkers who were certainly not going to 
strike just to let their families starve' (1970:40). The next attempt was a food strike on the 
following day, when fresh pork, fresh water fish and poultry supplies from the Mainland were 
halted. But the effect was negligible as local supplies and the non-compliance of many meat 
stall-holders enabled sufficient food to be on sale in the market. In the meantime, counter-actions 
from the management such as the dismissal of striking workers and daily bonus for the non-
strikers were seriously thwarting the efforts of the struggle committees. By 15 June, it was 
obvious that the joint strike had lost its momentum and failed to achieve its objectives. But the 
struggle was to continue. On 24 June, the All Circles Struggle Committee and the All Trades 
Struggle Committee launched the more ambitious 'General Strike'.  
 
The transport workers (Star Ferry, China Motor Bus Company, Kowloon Motor Bus Company, 
and Hong Kong Tramways) led the action by stopping work for several days. But services 
provided by licensed taxis and unlicensed taxis and minibuses, and offers from the right-wing 
Trade Union Council to assist in maintaining transport services, reduced the disruptive effects of 
the transport strikes. Other strikes followed in quick succession in the next few days, when 
demonstrations and work stoppages occurred in the Hong Kong Electric Company, the Hong 
Kong-Kowloon Wharf and Godown Company, the Hong Kong Telephone Company, Taikoo 
Sugar Refinery, the dockyards and textile factories. At the height of the struggle, the New China 
News Agency in Hong Kong proclaimed a total of 500,000 industrial workers on strike,22 and 
asserted that 'politically, the arrogance of British colonial rulers in Hong Kong has been deflated 
and their real nature, that of a paper tiger, has been completely exposed'.23 Reports from 
independent and right-wing sources, however, presented a different account. An article entitled 
'Failure of Maoists' so-called General Strike' in the right-wing newspaper Hong Kong Times 
attributed the alleged defeat of the leftists to their lack of financial resources, the violence 
adopted in their struggles, and the declining support of the workers for a cause which had little to 
do with labour related issues.24 
 
The last large-scale effort launched by the struggle committees was a four-day trade suspension 
beginning from 29 June. In preparation, 59 struggle committees made a joint appeal for 
support:25 
 
'We want to display the heroic spirit of the Chinese nation. We hope that the 
Chinese compatriots in industrial and commercial circles ... will act in 
coordination with us in all respects so that we can be completely victorious in the 
trade suspension ... '. 
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The trade suspension, however, fell far short of having full support. The Government 
Information Services reported on 29 June that 50 to 60 per cent of the hawkers were doing 
business as usual; market stalls on Hong Kong Island and in Kowloon were operating at levels of 
90 and 70 per cent respectively; use of local pork and beef supplies was temporarily compen-
sating for shortages in Chinese arrivals; vegetable prices had doubled from normal rates but rice 
was in plentiful supply and the price was relatively stable. On 2 July, food supplies from China 
resumed. The next day the markets were full, prices had dropped to their customary level and the 
strike was over. 
 
The trade suspension was followed by a number of sporadic strikes, the most significant of 
which was the one called by the sizeable Seamen's Union on 16 July in an attempt to disrupt the 
delivery of goods in Hong Kong. The strike, however, did not secure extensive backing. By late 
July as the strike faded, the period of unrest in which industrial action played a prominent role 
also came to a close. Thereafter, the leftists relied mainly on other struggle tactics.26 Towards 
the end of the year, when there were signs of improvement in Sino-British relations, the left-
wing organizations in Hong Kong followed the policy of the motherland and replaced struggle 
with a 'smile campaign'. 
 
 
Why the Strikes Failed 
  
The left-wing organizations had used strikes as a means to challenge the legitimacy of the 
colonial government and to cripple its administrative capability in the hope of forcing the 
authorities to yield to their demands. The impetus and momentum of the struggle were derived 
from the Cultural Revolution in China rather than from a realistic assessment of the conditions of 
labour in Hong Kong. In 1967 the left-wing forces had neither a hegemonic position among 
workers nor the general population. While labour grievances undoubtedly existed, they were not 
of a magnitude and scope that could generate and sustain industrial actions sufficiently 
widespread to paralyze the economy. The leftists had conducted their struggle on a further 
miscalculation that the colonial authorities would capitulate when local efforts were reinforced 
by pressures from the Chinese Government. When it became obvious that China would offer 
little more than moral support, the left-wing organizations realized that they lacked the political 
and material resources to continue using strikes as the main struggle tactic. In the latter phase of 
the struggle, strikes were increasingly replaced by terrorist actions which relied not on mass 
support but guerilla tactics. 
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Marx's explanation for the failure of the proletarian revolution in Paris a little more than a 
century ago applies here: 'Men make their own history, but thy do not make it just as they please. 
They do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves ... ' (Marx 1852). The 
circumstances in 1967 did not constitute a solid basis for a successful Communist revolution. 
 
In 1967 the strongholds of left-wing labour unions were in the transport and public utilities (gas, 
electricity, and water) sectors, where union densities27 were as high as 77.6 and 66.3 per cent 
respectively. However, workers from these sectors, totalling about 79,000, constituted only 
around 12 per cent of Hong Kong's industrial labour force. Even within these sectors, the left-
wing forces were reduced by the presence of right-wing unions, who did not collaborate in the 
strike efforts. The manufacturing industries, in 1967 Hong Kong's most important industrial 
sector employing some 44 per cent of the industrial labour force, had only a union density of 
12.4 per cent and were hardly touched by leftist influences. In addition, the overwhelming 
majority of the non-manual workers both within and outside the government boycotted the strike 
calls. The political split within labour, the lack of sympathy and support among workers for 
industrial actions not based on genuine labour grievances, and the aversion of the population to 
the disruptive tactics of the struggle committees, combined to render the strikes a futile effort to 
mobilize the masses against the colonial authorities. What the struggle generated was not mass 
support, but anxiety and fear among a community many of whom had fled communist rule in the 
recent past. Indeed the circumstances in 1967 were such that the leftists in Hong Kong could 
only succeed by force, but without the solid support of China, that narrowly based force soon 
disintegrated. The political winds were not there in Hong Kong to enable 'a tiny spark to ignite a 
prairie fire'.28 
 
 
The Impact on Industrial Relations 
 
The 1967 strikes had been a test of the strength of the Pro-China labour unions. While the strikes 
failed in their larger objectives, they demonstrated the susceptibility of the working class to the 
call of the 'motherland' where workers were held to be the masters. They shattered the 
complacency of the government and management about labour relations and revealed that 
ideology could escalate apparently trivial labour disputes into a major political confrontation. 
Thereafter the government adopted a more positive and interventionist role in industrial 
relations, and management softened their opposition to pro-labour legislation. In industrial 
relations, 1967 was a watershed. But 1967 was also a stern lesson for the leftists in Hong Kong. 
Turner commented:'1967 represented a damaging experience for the FTU unions, and in the 
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following years they retreated to a subdued position' (1980:93). 
 
In Britain, the Parliament reacted to the turmoil with proposals for 'urgent action in the field of 
social and labour reform'29 in Hong Kong, and suggested the development of a strong labour 
office to provide redress of long-standing inequities and to provide an environment conducive to 
the development of a stronger and more unified labour movement seeking to advance its own 
interests. A number of major reforms were promptly introduced by the Hong Kong Government. 
In March 1968, a new Labour Relations Division was formed within the Labour Department 'to 
assist in the settlement of trade disputes and other complaints or differences arising between 
employers and employees out of contracts of service' and 'to offer advice on, and encourage the 
development of, better labour-management relations and personnel management practices' 
(Commissioner of Labour, Annual Report 1967-8:2).30 In 1968-9, the Department was 
strengthened with a 30 per cent increase in its approved staff establishment over the previous 
year. Thirty-three items of legislation were proposed by the Commissioner of Labour in 
February 1968, and eight items, including the important Employment Ordinance, became law 
later in the year. Described as 'the primary source of legislative protection for Hong Kong 
workers generally',31 the Employment Ordinance was designed to regulate the duration and 
termination of contracts, to provide for the protection of wages of employees and to control the 
operation of fee-charging employment agencies.32 It served as the basis for extending the rights 
and benefits of the workers, and in the next few years amendments to the Ordinance included 
requirement for employers to grant maternity leave and not less than four rest days per month, 
provisions for holidays with pay, annual paid leave, sickness allowances, severance payments, 
and protection against anti-union discrimination.33 
 
Enterprises, especially those which had been most affected by the 1967 strikes, such as the 
dockyards and the public utilities companies, now saw the need to resolve management - labour 
disagreements through established procedures. Responding to the initiative of the Labour 
Department, some fifteen enterprises instituted joint consultative committees in 1968-9,34 and by 
March 1972 49 establishments were known to have introduced some form of joint consultation 
more advanced than mere periodic informal discussions between management and workers.35 
 
The legacy of the 1967 strikes was succinctly captured by England and Rear: 
 
'The Government had always labelled itself the protector of labour ... but now it 
took on the role in earnest, seeing its function to discover what was needed, 
formulate proposals and then to convince the Unofficials (of the Legislative 
Council) and the business community that they were necessary and could be 
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adopted without damaging the economy ... . The Unofficials and the leaders of the 
business community slowly embraced the new orthodoxy, which in 1976 was 
articulated as an aim to make wages and conditions in Hong Kong second to none 
in Asia, bar Japan' (1981:20-1). 
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6. THE AFTERMATH OF 1967: 1968-1973 
 
The few years after 1967 were characterized by a significant change in the pattern of strikes. The 
frequency of strikes remained high throughout the period, reaching an annual average of 38 (see 
the summary Tables 3 and 4), which is the highest of the post-war periods so far with the 
exception of 1967. This upsurge cannot be accounted for solely in terms of the increase in the 
working population. The relevant data in the summary Tables 3 and 4 (i.e. number of strikes per 
100,000 workers) indicate a relatively high strike frequency, with an annual average higher than 
that of 1950-9 and 1960-6. The number of strikes also exceeded by far the corresponding figures 
for 1950-9 and 1960-6, though the difference dwindles when the size of the working population 
has been taken into account. The large number of strikes and strikers may lead us into thinking 
that the aftermath of 1967 is a period of high industrial conflict. But the data on man-days lost 
tell us otherwise: the average annual figure dropped even below that of 1960-6, which is an 
industrially peaceful period. And when the number of man-days lost is controlled by the size of 
the working population (i.e. number of man-days lost per 1,000 workers), the annual average is 
the lowest of the hitherto post-war periods. What we see in this period is thus: more strikes and a 
large number of participants which however resulted in fewer working days lost. The strikes had 
become shorter.36 What are the explanations for this syndrome? 
 
The 1967 upheavals and the subsequent increased concern of the government and the public for 
labour related issues had apparently raised the awareness of the workers about the conditions of 
their work and employment. Under the demonstration effect of 1967, the working class also 
became more ready to use industrial action as a means to voice and redress their grievances, and 
to seek improvements in their livelihood. This explains the high frequency of strikes. But the 
temporary retreat of the leftists in the aftermath of 1967, and the concentration of the right-wing 
unions on membership recruitment and enhancing their public image at this opportune moment, 
meant that most of the strikes lacked central leadership and strong organizational backing. In fact 
labour unions were involved in only around 18 per cent of the strikes in this period.37 This 
explains the predominance of localized small-scale strikes.38 
 
Another explanation for the short duration of the strikes probably lies in the Labour Department's 
more active role in industrial relations after 1967. England and Rear thus describe the change in 
the orientation of the Department: 
 
'(They) no longer wait for an invitation to intervene but take the initiative by 
going to the scene of trouble. They arrange meetings, conduct on-the-spot 
6 INTRODUCTION  
investigations and - often an effective mechanism by itself - explain the law to the 
parties' (1981:319). 
  
The greater involvement of the Labour Department in the settlement of disputes, as shown in 
Table 8, must have contributed to the speedy resolution of industrial conflict. 
 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table 8: Trade Disputes Handled By the Labour Department 
 
     Year                          Number       
 
                1956 - 66                       29 
                1966 - 67                          40 
                1967 - 68                          68 
                1968 - 69                          78 
                1969 - 70                        127 
                1970 - 71                        140 
                1971 - 72                        130 
                1972 - 73                        115 
                
 
Source: Labour Department Report; cited in England and Rear (1981:313), Table 23. 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
Another factor with important repercussions on industrial relations in Hong Kong was China's 
improved relations with the West in the few years after 1967. In 1969 the United States relaxed 
travel and trading restrictions with China, and in 1970 full ambassadorial meetings resumed be-
tween the two countries. China's international status advanced further with its entry into the 
United Nations in 1971 and President Nixon's visit to China in 1972. For the leftists in Hong 
Kong, these events implied the need for a change in their relation with the colonial authorities, 
from one of antagonism to one of mutual cordiality. This new orientation had an important 
influence on the development of industrial relations in subsequent years. 
 
 
The Re-emergence of the Third Force in the Labour Movement 
 
The events of 1967 raised the awareness of labour and of concerned members of the public that 
the workers' interests had for long been eclipsed by the political objectives of the two rival 
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labour factions in Hong Kong. The 'political' strikes of 1967 also poignantly demonstrated the 
vulnerability of the community to a labour movement which took its inspiration from political 
developments across the border. Obviously the labour movement needed a new direction, which 
soon developed among politically independent social groups, the so-called 'Third Force', in the 
aftermath of 1967. The Christian Industrial Committee (CIC) was the most important pro-labour 
organization that emerged at this stage. 
 
The Christian Industrial Committee was founded in 1967 under the auspices of the Hong Kong 
Christian Council, a fraternity confederation of Protestant denomination in Hong Kong. In 1969, 
it was made an auxiliary organization of the Council with full autonomous administrative 
jurisdiction and independent staff. Under its first director, Miss Margaret Kane,39 the CIC took 
on the role of a go-between between labour, management, government and other related social 
institutions. To acquire first-hand knowledge of the working conditions of labour, the CIC 
organized 'work-in-industry' seminars for theological students in the Chung Chi Seminary. These 
students worked during the day in factories under similar conditions as ordinary manual workers 
did, and reflected on their shopfloor experiences in seminar discussions in the evening. The 
Committee also held, as part of its educational programme, seminars on various industrial issues 
such as industrial conciliation, management and trade unions, and industrialization and the 
church in England and Asia. At the same time, in order to cultivate better communication and 
understanding with management, the CIC staff made frequent visits to factories and held 
discussions with managers on labour legislation and management - labour joint consultation. But 
the plight of the working class remained the primary concern of CIC. Among its many efforts to 
promote the welfare of labour was its proposal to the government, in 1968, for improvements in 
labour laws in the areas of job security, sick pay, paid holidays, minimum wages and protection 
of outworkers. The policy of the CIC in its first few years was summarized in the following 
statement in the director's report: 
 
'Although we have decided to give priority to work with workers, we value the 
relationship with management and wish to deepen it wherever possible' (Kane 
1969:11). 
  
CIC changed to confrontational strategies in its dealings with management under its new director 
Mr. Raymond Fung, who succeeded Kane in 1969. The most prominent feature of CIC's new 
approach was the publication, from May 1970, of the Workers' Weekly, a weekly newspaper 
which formed the basis of the Committee's pro-labour activities. The main contents of the 
Weekly were comments on the conditions of the working class, advocacy for labour reforms, and 
reports on major labour disputes in Hong Kong. But its activities extended far beyond mere 
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verbal communication. When a Correspondence Club (later re-named the Readers' Club) was set 
up in August 1970, with its members drawn mainly from labour, the Weekly developed into an 
important agency for promoting the solidarity of the working class. With the help of the editorial 
staff of the Weekly, members of the club organized themselves into several interest groups, 
which later expanded into larger labour organizations striving to advance the interests of 
workers.40 
 
Assistance to workers involved in labour disputes was another important contribution of the 
Workers' Weekly. The staff of the Weekly helped the workers in formulating their demands and 
strategies, and made arrangements for them to meet with other supporting bodies such as 
university students. The CIC soon earned the reputation the 'Robin Hood of labour', and it is 
noteworthy that in the two major industrial disputes of the early 1970s, the Cross-Harbour 
Tunnel Welders' Dispute (1970) and the Cable and Wireless Labour Dispute (1973), the workers 
turned to the CIC for advice and assistance. 
 
To raise the workers' social consciousness, the Weekly also launched a labour education 
programme, with graduates from universities offering courses in political science, sociology, 
economics, psychology, labour law and other subjects. When the Weekly suspended its 
publication in November 1973 - its work to be superceded by the CIC's new Labour Education 
Centre - its main objectives had been achieved, as the following report indicates: 
 
'Working men and women are now increasingly willing to fight for their rights. 
There has been a marked increase in the number of occasions when workers 
confronted management. There are more workers participating in significant 
social movements. Unionism, once feared and shunned even by workers, is now 
openly talked about in industrial plants' (Change 1973, No. 22:2). 
   
With its emphasis on leadership training for workers, the Labour Education Centre continued in 
the tradition of the Workers Weekly. By 1980, CIC's labour education programmes were offered 
in all the major working-class areas in Hong Kong,41 and local labour organizations with close 
affiliation to CIC soon developed on the basis of these programmes. In this way CIC established 
a widespread and penetrating network of support for its major campaigns. Further, through its 
ardent support of pro-labour activities and its active involvement in social issues,42 CIC 
established close working relationships with many pressure groups, trade unions and community 
organizations. Having thus consolidated its position in the labour world, CIC boldly attempted a 
new venture which in effect altered the  power structure within the labour movement in Hong 
Kong. 
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In 1980, in a call for joint efforts to campaign for improvement in industrial safety, it founded 
the 'Joint Secretariat of Hong Kong Trade Unions' whose members consisted of left-wing, right-
wing, as well as independent unions. In March the Secretariat issued a joint proposal for reforms, 
the first time when unions of different political persuasions in Hong Kong co-operated in an 
effort to advance the interests of labour. In the 1980s, when Hong Kong was beset with the 
problems of political reform and political future, the CIC accordingly concentrated its efforts in 
building the political consciousness and power of labour. By the end of the decade, CIC, under 
its current director Mr. Lau Chin-shek, had established itself as the leader of the 'Third Force' in 
the labour movement. 
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7. THE UPSURGE OF WHITE-COLLAR UNIONISM: 1974-81  
 
General Features 
 
The period under consideration is conspicuous in the sharp drop in strike activities in the first 
three years, and then, from 1977, a reversal to the trend of the previous period. The decline 
coincided with the economic recession of 1974 and 1975, when the annual growth rate of real 
gross domestic products dropped from 14 per cent in 1973 to a record low of around 2.5 per cent, 
and unemployment rose to very high levels compared with the past. The index of real average 
daily wages for industrial workers (excluding fringe benefits) which stood at 156 in 1972 and 
159 in 1973 fell to 141 and 137 in 1974 and 1975 respectively.43 
 
There are several explanations for this downward shift in strikes in a period of economic 
hardship. Levin (1979) attributes it mainly to the lack of resources on the part of the workers to 
mount and sustain strike action during a recession. He also acknowledges the contributions of 
the Department of Labour in the enforcement of redundancy and severance payments, as well as 
the public assistance scheme of the Social Welfare Department, all of which helped to mitigate 
the immediate economic impact of unemployment. England and Rear offer an informed 
explanation: 
 
'Trade union leaders from both left and right, as well as government officials at 
the highest level, told us that the message from China during this period, as before 
and since, was that the unions should avoid confrontation' (1981:167). 
 
The Governor in his 1975 address to the Legislative Council made a similar observation:44 
 
'I am sure that the excellent state of Anglo-Chinese relations and the friendly and 
practical way in which it has been possible to deal with any matters affecting 
Hong Kong have contributed to stability and confidence here during the year.' 
 
The resourcefulness and resilience of Hong Kong workers, we think, is an additional 
explanation. It is characteristic of the Hong Kong workforce to put up with hard times and, if 
necessary, make a living through alternative economic activities during periods of economic 
recession.45 Thus many redundant workers survived the economic hardship of 1974 and 1975 
through hawking activities.46 It was only from 1977, when there were clear signs that the 
economy was recovering, that the workers' aspirations and demands rose, leading to a climb in 
strike activities to a level similar to that in the early 1970s. For the period as a whole, however, 
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the propensity to strike (see summary Tables 3 and 4) falls even below that of the preceding 
period. The overall picture suggests that despite the high frequency of strikes compared to the 
years before 1967, strikes since that important turning point had been increasingly characterized 
by their small size in terms of number of participants and duration. Spontaneous wild-cat strikes 
predominated in this period as they did in the previous. Among the manual workers within the 
private sector, labour unions were keeping a low profile in confrontations against management. 
 
A different trend, however, was emerging among the non-manual white-collar workers, 
especially those within the Civil Service.47 As Table 9 below indicates, the number of civil 
service unions and their membership more than trebled between 1970 and 1981, while for the 
same period, the number and membership of all trade unions increased only by 35 and 76 per 
cent respectively. The difference is even more striking if we focus on the changes in membership 
and union density for the period 1974-81. The civil service unions grew by more than 100 per 
cent in membership, and union density increased from 33.3 to 51.3 per cent; total trade union 
membership grew by a mere nine per cent, and union density dropped from 22 to 16.9 per cent. 
A comparison of the civil service unions and the politically affiliated unions in Table 10 reveals 
a similar picture. Most noteworthy is the phenomenal growth in civil service union membership 
in contrast to the decline in membership of the left-wing unions. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9:  Changes in Union Membership and Density - A Comparison Between Civil 
Service Unions and All Employee Trade Unions, 1970-81 
 
 
  Civil Service Trade Unions         All Employee Trade Unions
                 Number   Declared     Density       Number     Declared         Density 
 Year                       Membership                                    Membership 
 
 1970       46      23,215       28.5         272      196,299     15.5 
 1971       49      25,692       30.4         376      221,619     17.4 
 1972       56      26,468       30.0         280      251,729     18.6 
 1973       60      30,348       32.1         283      295,735     21.2 
 1974       66      31,681       33.3         293      317,041     22.0 
 1975       77      35,755       34.3         302      361,458     23.9 
 1975       85      41,702       40.0         311      388,077     25.2 
 1977       93      44,424       41.0         313      404,325     23.8 
 1978      111     51,146       44.2         327      399,995     22.6 
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 1979      122     60,727       49.4         340      399,392     20.7 
 1980      134     63,218       49.0         357      384,282     19.0 
 1981      142     71,439       51.3         366      345,156     16.9 
 
Sources: data on civil service unions based on Arn (1984:238-9), Table 10.5. Data on employee 
trade unions based on Registrar of Trade Unions, Annual Reports, and Chiu (1987:203), Table 
6.1. 
 
 
Table 10: Changes in Union Membership - A Comparison Between Civil Service 
Unions, Left-wing Unions, and Right-wing Unions, 1974, and 1981. 
 
       Civil Service Unions            Federation of               Trade Union 
                                                Trade Unions                       Council       
              Number      Declared      Number     Declared      Number      Declared 
 Year         of             Member-       of              Member-          of           Member- 
             affiliated          ship        affiliated         ship        affiliated         ship 
               unions                             unions                              unions 
              
 1974     66       31,681          67       184,440        85        32,099 
 1981    134      63,218          69       169,647        70        25,927 
 
 
Sources: data on civil service unions based on Arn (1984:238-9), Table 10.5. Other data based 
on Levin and Jao et al. (1988:3), Table 1. 
 
Concomitant with the expansion of public sector unionism was the upsurge of industrial actions 
within the civil service. Between 1974 and 1981, some 23 incidents of industrial action occurred 
among civil servants48 who hitherto had seldom resorted to militant action against their 
employer.49 Further, if we examine changes in trade unionism in terms of industrial divisions in 
both the public and private sectors, the rapid growth of unionism among white-collar groups 
(employed mainly in community, social and personal services) stands out as a prominent feature 
of the 1970s, especially the second half of the decade. Table 11 below compares the changes in 
trade unionism in the community, social and personal services division with those in two other 
major industrial divisions. Several salient features emerge from this comparison. Union 
membership in the predominantly white-collar division, which had been below those in the two 
other divisions in 1974 and before, vastly exceeded them by 1981. Between 1974 and 1981, 
union membership declined in the manufacturing and transport, storage and communication 
divisions, but that in the services division more than doubled. Finally, between 1961 and 1981, 
union density in the services division rose by more than 100 per cent, while that in the other two 
divisions either remained stagnant or was on the decline. The significance of these developments 
among white-collar workers, and within the civil service is summarized by Levin and Jao: 
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'These changes have altered the social character of the labour movement. Up to the 
early 1970s, the trade union movement could be characterized as a movement 
mainly of manual workers and the lower-level stratum of workers in the 
commercial sector. Now, however, with the spread of unionization among the non-
manual, white collar groups in the civil service and in the fields of health, 
education and welfare, the labour movement embraces employees across a much 
wider spectrum of occupational groups.' (1988:5) 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 11: Number of Unions and Declared Union Membership, Selected Industrial 
Divisions 1961, 1971, 1974 and 1981 
 
                                                                        Transport, storage and                  Community, social 
Year                 Manufacturing                          communication                   and personal services
              Number of   Declared      Union       Number of  Declared       Union       Number of    Declared       Union 
               Unions     Membership  Density      Unions    Membership   Density        Unions    Membership   Density 
 
1961             99         39,309          10              38            57,304         78.3                 44          37,973         15.7 
 
1971             92         52,554          6.2             41            62,028         60.7                 71          34,058         19.1 
 
1974             90         74,996           -               43            82,840            -                   84           50,131           - 
 
1981             87         63,615          7.2             51            79,924         50.7               163         116,259        33.1 
                                    
 
Sources: information on union density based on Chiu (1987:205-7), Tables 6.2a-c (data on union 
density for 1974 not available). All other information based on Registrar of Trade Unions, 
Annual Reports. 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
The Upsurge of Unionism in the Public Sector and among White-Collar Groups: 
Explanations 
 
The rapid expansion of trade unionism in the civil service and among white-collar groups is to 
some extent a reflection of the increase in the number of employees in the relevant sectors. 
Between 1971 and 1981, the strength of the civil service increased by 59 per cent, from 81,511 
to 129,217,50 while the core of the white-collar component (i.e. professional/technical, 
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administrative/managerial, clerical and sales categories) of the working population grew by 83 
per cent, from 410,007 to 749,635.51 A reference to Tables 9 and 11, however, indicates that 
proportionally the growth in union membership by far exceeds the growth in working population 
in these sectors. In the previous section, we also noted the upsurge of industrial actions in the 
public sector in the second half of the 1970s. What factors explain the increased militancy 
among civil servants and union expansion among the white-collar groups when unionism and 
militancy among manual workers were on the decline? 
 
The impetus of change in public sector unionism came from the 1967 disturbances. In an attempt 
to foster joint consultative structures in the private sector, the government set an example in June 
1968 by establishing a joint consultative mechanism, the Senior Civil Service Council, to deal 
with its own labour matters. The Council comprised representatives from the government (with 
the Deputy Colonial Secretary as chairman) and from the three main staff associations: the Hong 
Kong Chinese Civil Servants' Association, the Association of Expatriate Civil Servants and the 
Senior Non-Expatriate Officers' Association. Civil servants' pay and job-related matters were the 
main concerns of the Council, and the agreements reached in this body were to be binding 
throughout the civil service, including unrepresented staff associations and non-unionized 
workers. Apart from this consultative body at the central level, the government also encouraged 
the formation of consultative committees on a voluntary basis at the departmental level. These 
committees were intended to provide a formal forum for consultation between departmental 
management and staff on matters which relate to the internal administration of the department. It 
is ironical that the setting up of these consultative mechanisms was shortly followed by an 
upsurge of trade unionism and militancy among civil servants. This can be explained in terms of 
the inherent problems in the Senior Civil Service Council and the departmental consultative 
committees, and of the recommendations of the 1971 Civil Service Salaries Commission. 
 
The Senior Civil Service Council was intended to be strictly a consultative body, not a collective 
bargaining forum. Although negotiations may take place between the staff and official sides in 
the Council's meetings, management is under no formal obligation to bargain. Above all, the 
government has the right, in 'the public interest', to overturn the recommendations of the 
Council. The arrangement thus remains, in the words of England and Rear, 'an unequal treaty' 
(1981:270). 
 
Further, staff representation in the Council was uneven and inadequate. The Hong Kong Chinese 
Civil Servants' Association had most of its members drawn from staff in the middle salary range. 
The Association of Expatriate Civil Servants catered only to expatriate and by implication, 
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senior staff. And the Senior Non-Expatriate Officers' Association comprised only Chinese senior 
civil servants. The so-called minor staff, mainly manual workers, and the lower echelons of staff, 
who together constituted the bulk of the civil service, were not represented by any of the above 
three associations. In addition, the most representative of the three staff associations in the 
council, the Hong Kong Chinese Civil Servants' Association (with a membership of 2,802 in 
1968, 28 per cent of total union membership in the civil service) had a highly diversified 
organizational basis and could hardly cope in detail with the grievances of particular 
occupational groups. In 1974, when discontents within the civil service were beginning to 
surface in staff-management disputes, the three 'representative' associations together had a 
membership of 6,302, 20 per cent of the total civil service union membership. The remaining 63 
departmental or grade associations, some with a membership larger than any one of the three 
staff bodies in the Senior Civil Service Council, did not participate in its formal consultation 
process. On the other hand, the constitutions of the departmental consultative committees 
excluded deliberation on matters which were the prerogative of the Senior Civil Service Council. 
In particular, decisions on pay could only be made at the central level of government. It was 
against such background that many civil servants sought to redress their grievances outside the 
formal consultative bodies through industrial actions. The precipitating factor for these events 
was the Report of the 1971 Salaries Commission. 
 
The Report recommended radical changes in the civil service salary scales.52 After its 
publication in July 1971, numerous grades in the civil service expressed to the government their 
dissatisfactions over the recommendations but to no avail. In the words of a prominent civil 
service union leader of the time, 'this sowed the seeds of antagonism between the civil service 
unions and the Government ...'.53 The upsurge of unionism and militancy in the civil service in 
the following years represented the staff's attempts to safeguard and advance their positions in 
the new pay structure. Labour disputes first emerged in 1973 among the clerical workers, who 
after a lengthy period of fruitless negotiation with the government, resorted to a '70 per cent 
work' industrial action in 1975. In the next few years, a succession of disputes and collective 
actions followed - the demarcators' dispute over pay structure and duty list (1974) and 
subsequent work-to-rule (1976), the air traffic controllers' pay dispute and work-to-rule (1976), 
the surveying officers' dispute over pay structure and title and 'no field work' industrial action 
(1977), the shorthand audio-typists' pay dispute and work-to-rule (1977), and the police 
interpreters' dispute over pay and grade structure and industrial actions (1977). Labour disputes 
and industrial actions in the civil service reached their height in 1978, involving employees of 
the Social Welfare Department, postal workers, nursing staff, dental technicians, dispensers, tax 
inspectors, and hospital workers. At the same time, foremen of the Urban Services Department, 
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estate caretakers of the Housing Department, executive officers of the Government Secretariat 
and clerical grades of various departments were also contemplating industrial action. As one 
civil service union leader puts it, 'industrial actions ... in the Civil Service rolled on with the 
momentum of an avalanche'.54 
 
It was in this atmosphere of general dissatisfaction within the civil service that two of the largest 
and most influential white-collar unions were formed, with members drawn from employees in 
the government and in government-subsidized institutions. The Professional Teachers' Union, 
currently the largest trade union in Hong Kong, was established in the aftermath of the 
Certificate Teachers' dispute over a 1972 government resolution to reduce the salary of newly 
graduated Certificate Teachers by 20 per cent. Though the government subsequently withdrew 
the resolution, the incident was seen by teachers in general as the foreboding of a difficult time 
ahead for the teaching profession. The Professional Teachers' Union was thus formed in 1974 to 
strengthen the bargaining power of teachers in their future confrontations with the government. 
 
The founding of the Social Workers' General Union in 1980 was prompted by two events, both 
happening at around the same time in 1979. When some social workers were arrested and 
convicted for petitioning with the boat people of Yaumatei, members of the profession saw the 
urgent need for protection through the formation of a general union against what they perceived 
as unjust treatment from the government. This incident coincided with the Social Welfare 
Department Review which recommended improved promotion prospects for employees in the 
government, but not for those in the voluntary welfare agencies. Objection to this bifurcation 
was the additional factor conducive to the formation of the Social Workers' General Union, who 
subsequently won their demand for equal treatment for the voluntary agencies. 
 
Meanwhile, the government was introducing measures to curb unrest in the civil service and to 
improve staff-management relations. Civil Service Regulation 611 was introduced in 1977, 
giving the Secretary for the Civil Service the power to suspend without pay any officer who 
omits to perform any of his duties in connection with a trade dispute. In 1978, the Staff Relations 
Division was created within the Civil Service Branch. The division was given the task of 
mediating between management and staff associations in the departments, and building up 
communication and trust between the two sides. In January 1979, the government set up the 
independent Standing Commission on Civil Service Salaries and Conditions of Service, 
comprising nine part-time unofficial members from a cross-section of the community. Its terms 
of reference are, among other things, to advise on the principles determining civil service grade 
and salary structures, to review regularly and systematically the salary and grade structures, and 
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to advise on suitable consultative procedures. The established consultative bodies at the central 
and departmental levels would continue to operate with regard to the role of the Standing 
Commission. 
 
The Standing Commission's reports on civil service salary structure in the next few years 
occasioned further disputes and industrial actions, though under the impact of CSR611, most of 
these did not escalate into strikes. Despite the efforts of the government at improving staff-
management relations, militancy among civil servants remained rampant towards the end of the 
decade. The expansion within the civil service of professionals and people with specialized 
training laid the foundation for the growth of occupational groups keen on defending and 
advancing their rights and interests. With the rapid growth of civil service unions, a younger 
generation of change-oriented leaders were emerging, gradually replacing the more conservative 
compliant leaders of the past. In addition, many civil servants realized from the experiences of 
the 1970s that collective action would be an effective way to wrestle concessions from the 
government. Industrial peace in the civil service did not seem to be on the horizon with the 
approach of the new decade. 
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8. POLITICAL CHANGE AND THE LABOUR MOVEMENT: 1982-9  
 
Negotiations between China and Britain on the future of Hong Kong began with Mrs. Thatcher's 
visit to Beijing in September 1982. The progress of the negotiations and the status of Hong Kong 
after 1997 since then became the focal concerns of the community. In industrial relations, such 
concerns were reflected in the change in the emphasis of the trade unions in the private sector, 
from safeguarding the interests of workers vis-a-vis management, to developing and advancing 
the political leverage of labour in the political reforms that were to occur in the transition to 1997 
and the years after. This re-orientation was the main reason for the sharp decline in strike 
activities, making this period industrially the most peaceful since the end of the Second World 
War. In the civil service, despite the Standing Commission's efforts to improve staff-
management relations, unrest continued. The following section examines the problems in joint 
consultation in the public sector and the related industrial disputes. This will be followed by a 
discussion of recent developments in the labour movement in the private sector. 
 
 
The Public Sector: Continuing Unrest 
 
In contrast to the industrial peace in the private sector, the civil service in the 1980s experienced 
another wave of industrial disputes. The period in fact began with improvements in joint 
consultation introduced on the recommendations of the Standing Commission. In December 
1982, a Model Scale 1 Staff Consultative Council was set up for the lower rank staff who 
previously had been excluded from joint consultation at the central level. At the departmental 
level, departmental consultative committees were now made mandatory for all departments with 
100 staff or more. Yet attitudes of cynicism towards the consultative machinery prevailed among 
civil servants who, according to civil service union leaders,55 regarded the departmental 
consultative committees as 'window-dressing', 'just a forum for communication on the small 
issues', and 'not ..... a place in which to resolve the important issues'. The consultative bodies 
soon proved to be inadequate in curbing the mounting unrest in the civil service generated 
initially by discontents over the Standing Commission's pay recommendations, and later 
aggravated by the 'brain drain' and staff shortage. 
 
Right from the beginning, the Standing Commission encountered the op-position of the staff side 
to its pay recommendations. Its Report No. 8, published in June 1982, which recommended the 
lowering of the start-ing salary point of certain civil service grades, led to a series of protest 
actions including a two-day strike with some 2,000 participants and a one-month go-slow action 
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by members of four civil service unions. A period of industrial peace followed in the next few 
years when attention was focused on the Sino-British negotiations on the future of Hong Kong 
after 1997. But signs of unrest surfaced towards the end of 1985 when government announced 
that directorate salaries would be increased by between 6.4 and 13.5 per cent, effective from 
August 1985, on the grounds that they had fallen behind those in the private sector. Non-
directorate civil servants demanded similar increases to make up for the shortfall between 
1979/80 to 1984/5. Discrepancies between the staff's demands and the Standing Commission's 
recommendation for a 2 per cent increase led to a series of protests. The first large-scale protest 
rally occurred on 30 January 1986, with around 1,000 civil servants from 27 unions marching to 
demand a 6.4 per cent pay increase effective from 1 August 1985. On 25 February, 
representatives from 95 civil service unions with a total membership of around 60,000 met to 
elect a 17 member committee to pursue negotiations with the govern-ment. Two further mass 
demonstrations, each with around 2,000 civil servants participating, followed on 28 February 
and 23 March. Despite the staff's opposition, the government finally decided on a 2.7 per cent 
increase with effect from 1 January 1986, but prom-ised a full pay-level survey in the financial 
year 1986/7 for necessary pay adjust-ments. This survey was the cause of another wave of 
protests in the civil service. 
 
The pay-level survey was undertaken in the months of August to October 1986 by Hay 
Management Consultants (Hong Kong) Ltd., which was selected by the Standing Commission 
without consultation with the staff side. Among other things, the findings of the survey indicated 
that the toal pay package for upper non-Directorate civil servants was at least 30 to 46 per cent 
better than that received by three-quarters of their private sector counterparts. The affected civil 
servants contested the findings on the grounds that the survey was based on a flawed 
methodology which led to erroneous assessments of the benefits received by civil servants, and 
to the application of inappropriate criteria for job evaluation.56 The staff were also discontented 
with the fact that the survey data were not available for the staff associations' scrutiny, and that 
the survey had been undertaken in haste without prior consultation with the unions. In protest, 
staff representatives of the police force withdrew from the Pay Level Survey Advisory 
Committee in November 1986. This was followed by the withdrawal of the staff representatives 
of the Senior Civil Service Council the following month. The government, however, remained 
adamant in its decision to use the survey results as a reference in awarding future pay rises. 
Staff-management relations deteriorated, cumulating in a further confrontation early in 1988 
over the findings of the 1987-8 pay-trend survey which, unlike the pay-level survey, was 
undertaken annually to determine the level of increase in civil service pay for the particular 
year.57 Again the staff side contested the methodology of the survey and refused to endorse its 
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results. Faced with this crisis, the government set up an Independent Review Committee on 
Disciplined Services Pay and Conditions of Service, and an Independent Committee of Inquiry 
to advise on civil service pay. The latter committee was charged with the responsibilities of 
reviewing the methodology used in the 1987-8 pay-trend survey, interpreting its findings and 
advising on the 1988 pay adjustments accordingly; and considering the methodology and 
findings of the 1986 pay-level survey and their validity as a basis for making adjustments to civil 
service pay. 
 
Meanwhile the brain drain generated by uncertainties over Hong Kong's future led to staff 
shortage in the civil service. This exacerbated the civil servants' discontents. In the last few 
months of 1988, petitions and protests were rampant among the most affected occupational 
groups - the medical doctors, the nurses, and the surveyors. Pay increases and improvements in 
conditions of employment were the major proposals from these groups to attract more people to 
enter these occupations and to compensate for the additional volume of work. When negotiations 
with the government reached a deadlock, the petitions escalated into industrial actions. In 
November 1988, the surveyors began a partial boycott of their official duties. The doctors 
followed suit in March 1989. In the same month, the nurses launched their work-to-rule 
industrial action. 
 
In the midst of these disputes, protests of a different nature were gathering storm subsequent on 
the release in December 1988 of the report of the Independent Review Committee on Disciplined 
Services Pay and Conditions of Service. As usual, dissatisfaction over the recommended amount 
of pay increase was the underlying cause of the discontent. In addition the report's 
recommendation to award different pay increases for different disciplined forces and for 
different grades encountered the opposition of those who were to receive less preferential 
treatment. Thus while the staff of the police force protested against their meager pay increases 
relative to those of other disciplined forces, the middle and lower rank police officers opposed 
their lower pay increases within the police force. Similar discontents were voiced among the 
staff of the Fire Services Department who marched in protest and threatened industrial action. 
The non-disciplinary civil service employees, for the time being, were placated by the 
government's announcement of a pay increase of 9.6 per cent, which was a significant 
improvement over the Standing Commission's recommendation earlier in the year. Then early in 
1989, the Independent Committee of Inquiry released its report declaring the invalidity of the 
1986 Hay Pay-level Survey and its inappropriateness as a basis for civil service pay adjustments. 
The government further announced, in April, its plan to carry out a large-scale grade-level 
survey of the non-disciplinary staff in the near future. Apparently as the decade was drawing to a 
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close, the government was making concessions in an effort to lift the commitment and morale of 
the civil service which would be essential in ensuring a smooth transition to 1997. But 
dissatisfaction over pay, brain drain and the concomitant problem of under-staffing will continue 
to plague the civil service. The challenge ahead of the civil service in the 1990s is aptly summa-
rized by England: 
 
'Government has the resources to allay immediate civil service grievances but it 
must not give the impression that in the 1990s it has no option other than to 
concede demands made by the staff associations. Doubtless it will try to ensure 
that no other contentious issue emerges to unite the majority of its employees 
against it. ... For their part, the civil service unions should be wary of overplaying 
their hand in a society that through political change will increasingly call them to 
account' (1989:95). 
 
 
The Private Sector: The Realignment of Political Forces Within the Labour Movement 
 
Of all the factors that helped to erode the entrenched political rivalries within the labour 
movement, China's sovereignty over Hong Kong after 1997 must count as the most crucial. In 
light of the political realities of the future, the political allegiance of the Trade Union Council 
and its affiliates seemed ill-fated. To continue in their antagonisms against the Pro-China 
Federation of Trade Unions would be fighting a lost battle, and in any case, not congenial to the 
community whose dominant concerns were now consensus and order. The FTU saw the situation 
in a similar light and promptly call upon all trade unions to work in unity towards the following 
goals: 'to promote political democratization', 'to participate positively in the drafting of the Basic 
Law', 'to build up good relations with every sector on a new basis', and 'to fight for legitimate 
rights for the workers and seek greater welfare'.58 Its stance in the 1980s was described in its 
chairman, Mr. Cheng Yiu-tong's speech at the 1988 General Meeting:59 
 
'We are willing to foster closer unity and co-operation with all workers, trade 
unions, labour organizations and people from other strata of the society and make 
common contributions to the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong.' 
 
This call for unity from the FTU met with a mixed reception. On the one hand, trade unions on 
numerous occasions in the 1980s set aside their political differences and joined together with 
other community activists to petition government on a range of issues, including a central provi-
dent fund and taxation. And since the implementation in 1985 of the system of indirect election 
to the Legislative Council, labour as a functional constituency has elected two representatives, 
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one each from the rival union factions. On many general labour issues, these representatives 
have acted together. With the entry of labour representatives into the Basic Law Drafting and 
Consultative Committees following the signing of the Sino-British Joint Declaration in 1984, the 
interests and welfare of labour as a whole in the future Special Administrative Region became 
the paramount common concern of the workers. 
 
But the erosion of the entrenched division between the left and the right factions was succeeded 
by the emergency of a new rivalry. To the Christian Industrial Committee,60 the FTU's new 
emphasis on peaceful co-existence under the capitalist system was a continuation of its practice 
of aligning the labour movement to the policies of China. Criticizing the FTU for sacrificing the 
interests of labour, the CIC in the 1980s took up the role of organizer and leader of an 
independent labour movement. With its staff serving as advisers and organizers, the CIC 
promoted the formation of trade unions by placing its premises and secretarial resources at the 
disposal of the interested workers.61 Its leadership was consolidated when in 1984 it founded the 
Hong Kong Trade Union Education Centre which provided a forum where various independent 
unions from both the public and private sectors could meet and discuss labour issues. In 1988, in 
a move to establish a centre of independent unions to strengthen the autonomy and power of the 
labour movement, the CIC convened a conference which was attended by representatives of 
international trade union secretariats as well as representatives of local independent unions and 
organizations. By the end of the 1980s the CIC's task of building an independent labour 
movement in juxtaposition to the FTU - dominated movement was near completion. In an 
interview in connection with the China Motor Bus Drivers' industrial dispute in November 1989, 
the CIC's chairman Mr. Lau Chin-shek spoke of the prospects and implications of the 
realignment of union forces in the labour movement: 
 
'...The dispute reflects that the welfare of workers has long been neglected. The 
China Motor Bus Company is just one of numerous examples. The response of 
trade unions to the incident has been slow ... the force of labour is weak. To 
remedy the situation, Hong Kong is in urgent need of an alliance of politically 
independent trade unions. ... We are now in the final stages of building The Hong 
Kong Confederation of Trade Unions ... and hope to formally establish this 
organization around the beginning of next year. ... The objectives of this 
Confederation are to foster solidarity among independent trade unions, to 
safeguard their independence, and to promote the labour movement and the rights, 
welfare and social status of workers ... Some thirty unions are expected to join the 
organization, and the estimated memebership will exceed 100,000. The 
Confederation will be a non-political organization and will have no connections 
with the left-wing and right-wing factions. But it will advance the cause of 
democratization. ... In the current political process, both in the drafting of the 
Basic Law and political reforms, the working class has been relegated to the status 
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of a minority among various social groups while business has emerged as the 
privileged sector. In view of this, we hope that the Confederation can mobilize the 
forces of labour to check and balance future political development. ... With regard 
to political participation, the Confederation will discuss with its member unions 
whether to elect its own representative to the labour functional constituency in the 
Legislative Council ... ' (Sing Tao Daily, 19 November). 
 
With the CIC gradually superceding the TUC as the counter-balance to the domination of the 
FTU, the labour movement in the 1990s will again be beset with the problem of internal disunity. 
The extent to which labour will be able to exert its influence on the sweeping changes destined 
for the 1990s will depend significantly on its ability to reconcile its internal differences. One 
thing, however, is evident. The working class is becoming increasingly conscious of its rights 
and political status in the future society. The development of labour as a political force - the 
legacy of the 1980s - will continue to be the dominant goal of the labour movement in the 1990s. 












